South Bronx Community Connections

A Pilot Project of Community Connections for Youth: A Grassroots Approach to Pro-social Adolescent Development in a Neighborhood of Chronic Disadvantage

Phase I: A Formative Evaluation

John Jay College of Criminal Justice
November 2013
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Foreword

South Bronx Community Connections (SBCC), a three-year pilot project, is guided by a theory-of-change that relies on the development of nascent resident strengths within neighborhoods of chronic disadvantage. By extending this strength-based approach to the pro-social development of neighborhood juveniles, SBCC changes the lens from “risk-focused” interventions to indigenous resources that can be effectively bundled in favor of resiliency.

The pilot, funded with a federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDPA) federal formula grant from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), was awarded to Community Connections for Youth (CCFY), the lead agency for implementation of its SBCC program for court-acquainted juveniles. The pilot was funded at $1.1 million, under the category “Breakthrough Research-based Strategies.” Funding was awarded with the proviso that SBCC’s potentially “game-changing strategies” be rigorously evaluated — an altogether reasonable expectation given the growing political importance of the project’s neighborhood context, concerns about the efficacy of out-of-home placements for court-involved juveniles, and the substantial size of the award. John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York (CUNY), was awarded a subcontract by CCFY to provide a comprehensive evaluation of its SBCC pilot project.

The technical report that follows is different from the original evaluation design. It does not provide an evidentiary chain that links SBCC’s theory-based program model to research-based strategies, to outcomes, nor is it a small “N” case study. Given an ever-evolving implementation context, it was not possible to determine an evidentiary chain linking SBCC’s theory-based program model to research-based strategies and then on to outcomes; shifting priorities and unanticipated problems produced project modifications, which precluded the use of a rigorous methodology. A small “N” case study was jeopardized by changing policies, which challenged the consistency of the pool of juvenile eligibles.

Accordingly, the technical report that follows is more formative than summative. It provides meaningful, useful information that present stakeholders, policymakers, and future implementers of innovative grassroots programs can use to increase the probability of success.

Simply summarized, SBCC’s grassroots model has several potential strengths deserving of continued experimentation and exploration. Conceptualizing, designing, and implementing a “game-changing” program is more demanding than SBCC providers recognized, or than many funders appreciate. In fact, a three-year time-frame — given the innovative nature of the project model — underscores both the legitimacy of many evaluators’ concerns with “evaluation-readiness” factors, and their desire to balance the information needs of stakeholders and decision-makers with methodological rigor.

After a planning year, and two years of implementation devoted to tweaking the pilot project model to increase effectiveness, the latest of four program logic models identifies several intertwined strategies — Family Engagement, Comprehensive
Grassroots Involvement, and A Strength-based Focus — each accompanied by relevant research-base activities. The activities are presumed to build neighborhood social resources via the capacity building technical assistance of CCFY and SBCC.

The outcomes at the conclusion of this first phase of what hopefully will become a stronger program model, buttressed by a series of increasingly rigorous evaluations, are summarized below. Some of the outcomes are already evidence-based and are identified by an asterisk (*). Others are suggestive and encouraging, but, in the absence of sufficient data, are not yet measurable. These are identified by the letters “ID” (ID). Still others, though intriguing, remain hypothetical, needing to be meaningfully crystalized and objectified. These are noted with the letter “H” (H). All are worthy of attention and continued development if progress with the pro-socialization of court-acquainted youth is to continue.

Implementation challenges that SBCC encountered, while unique to their circumstances, are broadly applicable to the field as a whole. The lessons they suggest as well as a complete discussion of the findings are contained in the technical report that follows.

**Individual Juveniles**

- **Juveniles who were meaningfully engaged** in project civic activities with “coaches,” “mentors,” and peers for at least 60 days were significantly more likely to remain uninvolved in the justice system during the following year than was a borough-wide comparison group. Further, juveniles who remained active for at least 90 days were the most likely to remain uninvolved in the justice system. (*)

- **Given the project’s reliance on official referrals for participation, an agency mandate is a compelling facilitator.** (*)

- **Given a timely referral (within a week of arrest), those with a 75% attendance rate within the generally imposed 60-day probation mandate, continued participation post-mandate, suggesting that juveniles can bond quickly and remain engaged for considerable time.** (*)

- **While youths were typically mandated to attend SBCC for 60 days, the project was able to keep them involved beyond the duration of their probation mandate. The treatment group (N=62) remained engaged an average of 209 days.** (*)

- **Similar to project-involved adults, juveniles appear to progress through three stages of social development: victim, survivor, and leader.** (H)

**Families**

- Although superficially homogeneous, project-involved adults were not equally ready to participate in the evidence-based Strengthening Family Program (SFP). A second family focused group, the Family Support Group Meeting, addressed the unresolved issues raised by an unresponsive (to SFP) sub-group of interested adults. (ID)

- **Within 14 months, several adult caretakers developed the interest and skill to obtain stipended positions as Parent Coaches, assisting the SBCC Family Services Coordinator to implement a new, borough-wide contract.** (*)

- **In the absence of social network analysis, several adult caretakers self-identified as belonging to a supportive social network by the end of the initial implementation period (ID).**

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1 Meaningful engagement was defined as 75% attendance in site meetings for each 30 days of enrollment.
Neighborhood Providers (Partner Coaches)

- By the close of implementation year 2, SBCC had expanded into a second neighborhood, and an additional juvenile provider (coach) was added. (*)
- By the second year of the project all five provider/coaches engaged as a team: In addition to site-specific youth participation, all sites welcomed intra-site participation. (*)
- “Teaming” (providers and SBCC working as a team) and the concomitant familiarity among juveniles, coaches, and mentors facilitated the bundling of support provided to juveniles and their families during critical junctures of pro-social development. (*)
- By the conclusion of the pilot, all sites included SBCC juveniles in mainstream activities. (*)
- Two of the five neighborhood providers, lacking formal status as independent non-profits, submitted 501(c)3 applications, with assistance from SBCC. (*)

The Evolution Of A Grassroots Project

- While SBCC’s MIS could not be developed rapidly enough to supply all the data that would be needed for rigorous, statistical analysis, there was sufficient data relevant to the implementation experience to suggest the following hypotheses:
  - Family engagement enhances the probability that juveniles will continue program participation beyond an official mandate;
  - Parent-to-parent support from neighbors facilitates the development of social capital;
  - Reliance on neighborhood residents for support facilitates a shift from a deficit- to a strength-based focus;
  - A strength-based focus ameliorates defensiveness created by “treatment” models;
  - To maintain grassroots integrity, grassroots groups, when partnering with government agencies, must also work continually with neighborhood level representatives so that operational logistics are understood and acceptably aligned with agency culture and practice; and
  - Personal relationships based on common experiences are an important factor when trying to develop social capital.
South Bronx Community Connections (SBCC) has been a three-year pilot project, implemented under the aegis of Community Connections for Youth with a Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Administration (JJDP) federal formula grant from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). The principals of CCFY, a fledgling grassroots non-profit, were attracted to the unrestricted nature of the DCJS request for proposals (RFP). Contemplating the opportunity to develop a neighborhood-based delinquency reduction project, the unrestricted RFP afforded the SBCC the chance to test a long-held vision: that chronically disadvantaged neighborhoods could rally enough community resources to promote the pro-social development of its juveniles who were already acquainted with the justice system.

The DCJS contract, if awarded, would enable SBCC to empirically demonstrate that partnerships with neighborhood youth serving groups in Mott Haven (the South Bronx) could be used to tap indigenous social networks for adult volunteers to serve as “mentors” to neighborhood youth. As initially conceived, selected partners would provide both meeting space and their youth coordinator’s time, which would be used to supervise mentors, track attendance, and submit participant progress reports to SBCC at monthly discussion sessions. Every six to eight weeks, SBCC would host a neighborhood forum, where problems and progress could be shared with neighborhood residents.

Neighborhood youth participants would be between 12 and 15 years old. They could be identified by neighborhood “influentials” as well as by representatives of the juvenile justice system. Subsequent to a specially designed intake procedure, participants would be assigned to one of the neighborhood partners for an introduction to his or her adult mentor. Once participants engaged with peers and mentors on a neighborhood civic project, opportunities for constructive problem solving and social bonding would provide the stimulus and appropriate setting for pro-social development. At least, this was the group’s initial thinking.

CCFY submitted a proposal that called for annual operational funds sufficient to cover the full time salaries of a small operational staff (N=4); motivational stipends for collaborating neighborhood partners ($5,000 each); the costs of civic projects and local travel ($10,000); and the fee for an evaluator — the single stipulation in DCJS’s otherwise unrestricted RFP ($65,000).

At the conclusion of a planning year, but prior to completing the first iteration of a project logic model

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2 The “mentor” designation was changed to “coach” prior to implementation, and several adaptations to the vision were implemented over the course of the demonstration.
reflecting its implementation plans, the project’s directors added Karol Kumpfer’s Strengthening Family Program (SFP) to its other strategies. This was in deference to the need for an evidence-based program component capable of addressing dysfunctional families. With the addition of the SFP, the logic model could acknowledge the role that the SFP might play in fostering the further development of social networks among heretofore socially constrained parents — a valuable component in the capacity-building vision that supported the SBCC project.

The reader need not be reminded that even the best-laid plans often go astray. This was surely the case for SBCC. Flawed assumptions, bureaucratic inertia, external juvenile justice policy changes, and CCFY’s own capacity as a lead agency challenged the momentum of effective implementation. The following narrative includes examples of these challenges and accounts for several adjustments made to the SBCC project and its logic model.

The encouraging news is that by fall 2013, two years into project implementation, a statistical analysis of SBCC’s available data (see Appendix A) found juvenile project participants to be suggestively, but significantly (p value = 0.09), less likely to be re-arrested within a year of their last offense than was a matched comparison group. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding the question of whether or not SBCC was attractive enough to keep a young adolescent engaged was now answered — affirmatively!

Adding to the good news, the number of neighborhoods covered by the project had expanded (N=2) by implementation year two, as had the number of neighborhood partners (N=5). Mentors, now referred to as “coaches,” remained constant, and, in accordance with the CCFY vision, they collaborated with SBCC staff in the resolution of family and youth crises beyond that which was expected.

The reach and outcomes of the evidence-based SFP were complemented by a second group of SBCC parents, a Family Meeting Group. Representatives from both groups worked alongside the SBCC Family Services Coordinator to gain experience and skill relevant to outreach and neighborhood support services. Importantly, SBCC had attracted sufficient additional funding to sustain and improve its project beyond the conclusion of its DCJS contract at the close of 2013.

The challenge for SBCC is that the level of significance relevant to recidivism is not yet strong enough. A significant challenge to increasing the strength of youth outcomes lies in SBCC’s ability to compensate for the unexpectedly slow rate of referrals from juvenile justice agencies, the result of statewide changes in juvenile arrest and detention policies.

Further, without minimizing the finely calibrated leadership often in evidence at SBCC and CCFY, additional implementation challenges remain linked to CCFY’s internal capacity to marshal and focus its personnel, financial, and technical resources to better advantage than has, thus far, been the case. Therefore, the narrative that follows includes an admonition: Continued reliance by the lead agency on the un-tutored transferability of certain skill sets may result in outcomes that belie the potential of this, or any other, project model.
The three themes of Project Theory

CCFY’s South Bronx Community Connections (SBCC) pilot project builds on theory, prior research, and best practice. The project model integrates three conceptually linked themes from the literature to provide a framework for its developers’ vision. The first theme, the value of neighborhood social capital, has an extensive theoretical and programmatic history. Large- and small-scale community capacity building projects have received intellectual and financial attention from government, from private and public foundations, and from academia. Nearly all have produced ambiguous outcomes (e.g., Haines, et al., 2011).

The ambiguity of outcomes in the community capacity-building literature has altered the present SBCC project. Relevant to scale, “community” is defined as “neighborhood bounded.” A neighborhood, for the purposes of this pilot, encompasses a police precinct servicing one or more socio-economically definable populations, at least one middle school, and feeder elementary schools. In terms of scope, unlike prior projects that attempted to address quality-of-life issues across several domains (e.g., economic, educational, housing, health, etc.), the SBCC pilot focuses solely on enhancing neighborhood social capital as a potential resource for strengthening juvenile resiliency, despite the presence of risk factors associated with chronic disadvantage.

The second theme contributing to the project’s theoretical base emanates from prevention scientists and practitioners who champion the positive effects of youth resiliency as opposed to ameliorating individual or socio-ecological risks as precursors to the pro-social development of youth. The relatively new approach, promising but un-tested in clinical trials, is referred to as Positive Youth Development (PYD).

Thirdly, civic engagement emerges as a pro-social method of promoting bonding opportunities for neighborhood adolescents. Civic projects that are selected by adolescents and guided by adult mentors provide pro-social opportunities for the development of problem-solving skills, individual and group competence, individual self-esteem, and group
efficacy.

**The Evidence Base:**

**Why Neighborhood and Not Community?**
Beginning in early adolescence, an increase in unsupervised exposure to neighborhood settings and conditions occurs, along with direct contacts with “neighbors” (Allison et al., 1999). The neighborhood is an important environment for adolescent development, since it provides opportunities to build supportive networks with people and organizations. Neighborhoods can provide youth with opportunities for building shared values. When shared values and norms are encouraged, informal social controls and other cooperative behaviors increase (Leventhal, Dupere, & Brooks-Gunn, 2009).

According to studies, neighborhoods characterized by disadvantaged conditions — low levels of opportunity, high residential instability, and high crime rates — have a negative effect on a wide range of outcomes, including adolescent behavior. Place-based studies have argued that social processes within the neighborhood may mediate or moderate these effects (Dorsey & Forehand, 2003; Sampson, Rauderbusch, & Earls, 2003). Nonetheless, despite encouraging research, an extensive literature on the effects of neighborhood social conditions on the adjustment of adolescents (Kohen, et al., 2008) identifies poor and minority neighborhoods as among the more challenging settings for adolescent development.

**The Importance of Neighborhood Social Capital**
Jencks and Mayer (1990) identified mechanisms through which neighborhoods may affect adolescent development. Neighborhood social capital, loosely defined, is the most popular way of conceptualizing neighborhood-level social resources. Sarason, a seminal scholar contributing to the field of community psychology (1974), defines social capital in broad terms, as follows: “Neighborhood social capital engenders the perception of similarity to others, an acknowledged interdependence with others, a willingness to maintain this interdependence by giving to, or doing for, others what one expects from them, and the feeling that one is part of a larger dependable and stable structure.”

Although the concept of neighborhood social capital has gained both nuance and complexity in recent years, Sarason is still credited with defining the emotional core of a supportive neighborhood.

Social capital is promoted by neighborhood residents through trust, sharing, and informal support. More nuanced forms of social capital include both formal and informally organized “neighboring behavior,” or instrumental support as it relates to “getting ahead” (Perkins, Highey, & Speer, 2002). In fact, multiple streams of social capital research have suggested that it is an important mechanism in explaining psychosocial adjustment during adolescence, as indicated by its negative effect on antisocial behavior (Dorsey & Forehand, 2003; Furstenberg & Hughes, 1995).

**Parenting as an element of social capital and another critical mediator of neighborhood effects**
Both Bronfenbrenner’s ecological systems theory (1979) and various family system theories (e.g., Simons et al., 1996) describe how familial and social/environmental contexts interact in facilitating (or hindering) developmental outcomes. Current research, including an extensive review of studies examining the interplay of parenting behaviors and the occurrence of antisocial behavior among adolescents (Barber, Stolz, and Olsen, 2005), highlights the importance of parental support and parental behavioral control as predictive of adolescent antisocial behavior. Generally speaking, parenting is identified as a critical micro-systemic mediator of neighborhood effects (Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2000; Sampson & Groves, 1989).

Many research efforts have been helpful in demonstrating the deleterious effects of living in neighborhoods of chronic disadvantage on parenting closeness and monitoring (see, for example, Kohn, 2008). According to this perspective, the effects of neighborhood stressors on children and adolescents influence the types of behaviors parents might engage in with their children. For example, Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn’s (2000) review of neighborhood effects suggested that neighborhood disadvantage might affect factors ranging from a mother’s display of warmth toward children to parental monitoring of children’s behavior. In turn, a lack of these parenting behaviors has been associated with child and adolescent behavior problems (Veno, Nation, Pastore, & Santinello, 2009).

Perhaps the most important point to be made from

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this stream of research is that good parenting is often associated with the existence of social capital. As such, good parenting as well as social capital can be mediators of negative neighborhood effects. For example, Conger, Ge, Elder & Lorenz (1994) found that low neighborhood social capital is connected to emotional distress. Emotional distress was found to disrupt parenting that, in turn, resulted in an increased use of harsh and punitive parenting behaviors. In a relatively more recent example, Dorsey and Forehand (2003) found that low social capital in a neighborhood resulted in decreased parental support and monitoring.

Collectively, studies suggest that considerations of neighborhood effects on adolescent antisocial behavior would be incomplete without considering neighborhood effects on parenting. Vieno, Santinello, Pastore, & Perkins (2007) hypothesized that neighborhood social capital creates a context that shapes parents perceptions and behavior. Parental perception of low social capital is associated directly with higher levels of child behavioral problems and decreased use of certain effective parenting strategies (solicitation and support) that, in turn, results in more behavioral problems. According to this hypothesis, families living in disadvantaged neighborhoods display less capacity to act in a supportive involved manner (Kohen et al., 2008), solicit less information about their children’s whereabouts, and provide less monitoring of their children’s behavior (Chung & Steinberg, 2006).

Despite the methodological limitations of any of the above referenced studies, they collectively suggest that wherever youth development interventions take place, they should not ignore the key role of parenting styles and behaviors. These, in turn, are significantly influenced by parental perceptions of the social capital and safety perceptions that define the strengths (or weaknesses) of their neighborhoods. Research considerations that underscore the importance of the interplay between neighborhood context and parenting behaviors argue for an intervention model that focuses on opportunities for both addressing poor parenting skills and developing neighborhood social capital.

Collectively, evidence-based programs that facilitate family strengthening seek to change family behaviors by creating home environments that encourage healthy emotional growth in adolescents. In general, these programs have been implemented as part of a broader intervention that makes use of several strategies to influence intermediate and longer-term outcomes. Thus, the specific impact of a family-strengthening component is best understood in the context of a more comprehensive intervention.

Enhancing Youth Resilience: A Positive Youth Development Approach

Rather than a deficit approach, proponents of strength-based models have emphasized that adolescence can be a time of mastery linked to each young person’s unique talents, strengths, skills, and interests (Commission on Positive Youth Development, 2005). Positive Youth Development (PYD) models typically encompass a broad set of personal and contextual attributes that enable youth to reach their full potential as productive and engaged adults (Lerner, R.M., 2009), even as they live with risk.

In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services commissioned a large-scale report focused on positive youth development and its links to prevention of youth problem behaviors (Catalano, Berglund, Ryan, Lonczak & Hawkins, 1999). The report noted that 24 well-evaluated youth development programs resulted in significant reductions in a range of problem behaviors. However, these programs have not yet been tested in clinical trials.

Competency Models, as PYD models are often referred to in the research literature, place primary emphasis on “habilitation” — resilience to socio-ecological risk — as opposed to the “rehabilitation” emphasis of traditional risk-focused “treatment” models. Most simply, resilience manifests itself as the ability to respond, or perform positively, in the face of adversity, to achieve despite the presence of disadvantage, or to significantly exceed expectations under given negative circumstances (Gilligan, 2007).

Linking the prevention of anti-social behavior in youth and PYD, Nancy Guerra and Catherine Bradshaw (2008) summarized the developmental literature by identifying five core competencies related to resilience and, in the longer term, of

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4 Competency Models differ from risk-focused treatment models in their concentration on developing personal strengths and skills to mitigate the negative effects of socio-environmental risks.
healthy adjustment:
1. A positive sense of self
2. Self-control
3. Decision-making skills
4. A moral system of belief, and
5. Pro-social connectedness

Still other strength-based approaches focus on civic engagement as a key marker of positive youth development, emphasizing the need to foster initiative (Larson, 2007) and involve youth as active contributors to their communities (Huber, et al., 2003). And while there are other candidates for inclusion in a framework, these competencies capture important elements of evidence-based competence development and prevention programs. A central premise of this approach is that high levels of these competencies provide a marker for positive youth development, and low levels of the competencies increase the likelihood of adolescent risk behavior.

There is no denying the importance of empirically supported interventions to the field of child and adolescent development. Nonetheless, the evidence-based models have been risk rather than competency-focused models. As a result, it has been risk-focused programs that began to shape community programs and policies for youth over the last few decades. Challenges have now emerged.

From a pragmatic perspective, one of the principle challenges of the risk-focused approach has been the proliferation of separate problem-specific programs that support work in each risk area (Guerra, N.G. & Bradshaw, C.P., 2008). Such an approach reinforces the rigidity of a “silo” mentality.

A second challenge relates more generally to the vision of youth that emerged from the risk-focused approach. A programmatic emphasis on at-risk youth has been criticized for emphasizing what goes wrong, rather than what goes right. This perspective portrays youth as problems to be fixed, and development as a process of overcoming deficits and risk.

**Youth Civic Engagement**

Youth civic engagement has been seen as an “integrative mechanism” bringing together youth and adults around issues of shared interest (Minkoff, 1997; Putnam, 1993). Youth civic engagement has been described in terms of pro-social behaviors exhibited by youth through involvement in activities that are of benefit to them and to the neighborhood writ large (Youniss et al., 2002).

Civic engagement represents an important vehicle for promoting positive youth development. Several studies that focused on late adolescence have shown that civic engagement can promote experiences and behaviors that positively impact youth’s personal development, social development, and aspirations for the future. For example, Yates and Youniss (1996) reviewed 44 studies exploring the relation between adolescent participation in community-oriented activities and potential developmental benefits. The majority of the studies involved youth between 12 and 24 and pointed toward an increased sense of their own competencies. These youth were also more likely than those who were not civically engaged to have a higher internal locus of control and to show a higher level of comfort resolving social and interpersonal issues.

Yates, Youniss, and their colleagues (1997) argued that service activities provide a context for youth to observe and practice basic roles and processes of civic engagement. They also proposed that the formation of relationships with group members and adult leaders furnishes adolescents with valuable

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5 A sixth competency, Contribution to Society (Lerner & Benson, 2003), is often added.
6 See, for example, Life Skills Training (Botvin, Mihalic & Grotpeter, 1998), and aggression replacement training (Goldstein, 2004).
Planning for Implementation

This section outlines the planning process that preceded project implementation.

Research to Practice: Understanding What Works (Wandersman et al., 2008) noted that “understanding an implementing organization’s capacity is central to addressing the gap between research and practice.” Wandersman and his colleagues⁷ define organizational capacity as the necessary motivation and ability to identify, select, plan, implement, evaluate, and sustain effective interventions. In theory, the quality of implementation is influenced by organizational capacity; the characteristics of the community in which the innovation is implemented; the availability of training and technical assistance; the salience of the innovation and the commitment of the provider staff to its vision; and the sufficiency of external support. Under favorable circumstances, the variables in all five categories interact and lead to effective implementation, despite contextual constraints that may arise.

In a meta-analysis of 81 innovative interventions, Chinman and Wandersman (2008) found that funding is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for effective implementation.⁸ Seven characteristics were consistently related to the successful implementation of an innovative intervention:

• Skilled staff with a shared vision about the need for, and benefits of, the contemplated intervention; (Barr, et al., 2002; Ringwalt, et al., 2003; Problem solving proficiency, flexibility and adaptability; Berman & McLaughlin, 1976; Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 2002; Rogers, 2003).
• Effective Leadership (Hahn, et al., 2003)
• Collaborative decision making and local input (Kegler and Wyatt, 2003)
• Internal and external monitoring performance and outcomes (Cooke, 2000; Greenhaigh, et al., 2005; Fixen et al., 2005)
• Open communication (Shediac-Rizkallah and Bone, 1998)
• Availability of training and technical assistance (Allison et al., 1990).

The issue of “when” an innovative intervention is ready for a formal evaluation was also raised in this body of research. Its authors recommend that no program should be evaluated until sufficient time has been allotted for its effective implementation. Accordingly, this report represents the first step in what will hopefully become a series of evaluations that will attest to the efficacy of SBCC’s grassroots intervention for neighborhoods on the whole, as well as for different subgroups of participants.

SBCC’s need for ongoing evaluation was underscored in a study undertaken by Derzon and Lipsey (2005). Derzon and Lipsey found that the quality of implementation had a direct and measurable bearing

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⁷ American Journal of Community Psychology [2008] 41:327-350
⁸ Ibid.
on outcomes. Using regression analysis, these authors demonstrated a magnitude of difference favoring initiatives with better implementation: Outcomes for initiatives with robust implementation had 3 to 12 times the effect size as initiatives with weak implementation conditions.

**The Development of a Logic Model**

The project’s theory of change is primarily a guide to the evaluation. Previous studies of theory-based evaluation of small, marginally funded programs demonstrate the paucity of cases in which program theories were precise and correct (Weiss, 2000). Some of the programs activated the mechanisms that were assumed to trigger desired outcomes, but the desired outcomes did not materialize. Some of the programs produced the desired outcomes, but not through the mechanisms that were assumed to be causal.

Thus, a program theory serves many purposes. It helps clarify how a program is expected to work; it focuses the evaluation on key results; and it provides structure to the interpretation of results. In the end, whether or not the theory is correct, it will have provided a framework for thinking about how the program is working. Hopefully, this will lead to creative improvements to the present program model or better design approaches for future developers. In short, adjustments to initial program theory can be considered as a stage in the evaluation and cannot help but be beneficial.

SBCC used its planning year to good advantage. Working collaboratively with SBCC’s evaluation team, the project staff (initially, a project director, the executive director of CCFY, the project’s lead agency, an administrative assistant, and a clinical social worker) was diligent in responding to several challenges associated with developing a theory-based logic model.

Imbued with enthusiasm, commitment to a shared vision, and an individual and collective intelligence, staff capacity nonetheless ranged from the programmatically inexperienced to the programmatically naïve. Drawn together by prior friendship rooted in the community and by the verbal dynamism of a visionary Executive Director, the imposed need for empirically measurable outcomes seemed at first, to be an affront by the group: Theirs, after all, was a belief in the inevitable triumph of David over Goliath.

However, as the intellectual discipline required to develop a logic model emerged, the Executive Director and others recognized the intrinsic value of the tool they were developing. The logic model, through several iterations, was sufficiently detailed to facilitate identification of bottlenecks to progress and to expose the flawed assumptions that challenged expected outcomes. Yet each successive document was flexible enough to withstand the inevitable changes, as implementers gained insight from their implementation experience.

Each adjustment to the logic model reflected a more profound understanding of the context in which SBCC was operating and a healthier respect for the necessary balance between vision and management. The final logic model, Figure 1, can be examined on the following page; its predecessors can be examined in Appendices B1 & B2.
The image contains a diagram of the South Bronx Community Connections Logic Model, along with a table summarizing immediate and intermediate outcomes. The model is divided into sections labeled Target Population, Program Strategies, Immediate Outcomes, and Final Outcomes. Each section outlines strategies and outcomes associated with specific objectives.

### Target Population
- Community youths, 13-15 years old, facing delayed prosecution, who reside in the Mott Haven neighborhood of the South Bronx

### Program Strategies
- **Strategy #1:** Building Community and the Core Competencies of Community Youth: Community coaches work with youth on planning, implementing, and evaluating neighborhood improvement projects.
- **Strategy #2:** Family Strengthening and Social Networking: Family members of youth network to gain parent support, learn effective parenting strategies, and maximize resource acquisition.
- **Strategy #3:** Individualized Competency Planning: Youth undergo comprehensive strengths, needs, and risk assessment and develop individual strategy plans to build on assets and ameliorate risks.

### Immediate Outcomes
- For Strategy #1:
  - Full documentation of objectives, outcomes, and evaluation of participating/attending and performance measures: youth/parent volunteering.
- For Strategy #2:
  - Full documentation of outreach and facilitation of community members relevant to participation in parenting workshops.
  - Full documentation of curricula facilitator check.
  - Baseline measures of social networks.
- For Strategy #3:
  - Baseline profiles of youth and family context.
  - Profile of special needs and use of CCFY resources mapping project for referrals.
  - Timeline and effort relevant to referral and participation processes, the improvement in provider accountability, participant attendance, and performance measures.
  - Documentation ability of plans to complete Individualized Plan with outcomes benchmarks for youth and family attendance and performance measures: youth strength.

### Intermediate Outcomes
- For Strategy #1:
  - Phree agency’s ability to develop, track, transfer, and maintain an integrated system of performance accountability measures: one reformed community.
  - Youth project participation: school attendance, and behavioral performance after 30, 60, 90, 180+ days of program participation.
  - Behavioral benchmarks: resiliency, parental support.
  - Facilitators/strategies related to community “vanguard” community projects.
  - Documentation of characteristics contributing to participant capacity partnerships.
  - Translated assessments of community volunteer relationships with participating youth.

### Final Outcomes
- For Strategy #2:
  - Rate of attendance pattern at workshops.
  - Translatability of observations, parent volunteers, parent workshop assessments for evidence of sustained increased attendance.
  - Review of planning, outreach, community participation in social events.
  - Scale of social networks: social network diffusion.
  - Parent/child assessment: data on improvements in inter-familial communication.
  - Review of planning, facilitation, community core/partnering, liaison conferences.
  - Portrait of the phree agency’s ability to entail and engaging and sustaining a Family Action Committee.

- For Strategy #3:
  - Behavioral benchmarks: resiliency at designated intervals.
  - Behavioral dependency intervention/evaluation.
  - Youth attendance/performance at referral services.
  - Self-reports of prosocial activities.
  - Self-reports of behaviors, substance.
  - Self-reported engagement/behavioral assessment.
  - Self-reported family, peer, authority relationships.
  - Self-reported improvements in problem-solving skills.

### Summary
- Summary of youth/parent/community volunteer relevant participation rates at 30, 60, 90, 180+ days of participation.
- Legal status of youth.
- Profiles of “high,” “medium,” “low” levels of behavioral achievement for youth.
- Educational status for youth.
- Summaries of data, translated to reveal enhanced number/quality of peer/social attachment.
- Reductions/cessation of substance use/abuse.
- Differentiated measures of partner participation.
- Community survey: program recognition.
- Examples of community goal diffusion regarding at risk youth.
- Expansions in community-based leadership activities.
- Stressors and facilitators of program sustainability.
- Re-arrest and re-conviction rates of youth.
The Creation of a Dedicated MIS
SBCC recognized as it developed its initial logic model (Appendix B.1.) that a management information system (MIS) was also necessary to informed decision-making. Three separate data files were created: A neighborhood data file that included performance relevant information for the lead agency and its agency partners; a family database that tracked information related to the family as a social and socializing unit; and a file devoted to individual adolescents and their progress toward pro-social behavior.

Two points are relevant to the creation of the MIS. First, despite the existence of “in-house” technical talent, an MIS should be professionally developed and pilot tested for several months prior to concluding a development agreement. MIS development is costly, and the temptation is to resist inherent costs by “cutting corners.” However, forgoing genuine technical expertise or the substantive knowledge needed for funder accountability and managerial decision-making (as well as offsetting some of the cost of a robust evaluation), is far more costly in terms of lost time, future funding opportunities, and flawed decision-making. For example, having terminated its contract with a technical MIS developer in favor of completing the MIS with “in-house” talent, SBCC’s MIS is still less than fully functional, and the Executive Director has had to step in to “fill the breach” in order to complete this Phase I report.9

Second, despite the fact that SBCC’s small program staff had been molded into a relatively effective team by year 3, there is no denying that data collection and data entry was demanding and onerous. To ameliorate clerical and administrative stresses and strains typically faced by a small staff, SBCC secured the assistance of several interns (graduate students from nearby colleges and universities who gained academic credits for their on-site project work). This option generated its own problems and stressors. All of the interns were enthusiastic “doers” and “learners” and had high expectations for an exciting real-life, hands-on, supervised experience. In reality, their project responsibilities were loosely defined and, it turned out, they were neither adequately trained with regard to data collection and entry nor familiar enough with theory and frameworks to provide the necessary quality of assistance. Lesson learned: In the absence of a dedicated paid data person or “troubleshooter,” a volunteer needs to be well-versed in the project’s underlying principles, the purposes and structure of the project and its MIS, and should be included in meetings where qualitative and quantitative data is integrated into decision making.

Creating a Learning Community
Based on the premise that neighborhood partners, adult volunteers, family members and SBCC staff had much to learn from one another, and that implementation required transparency, the SBCC team created a “Learning Community.” The team committed to the following outline, based on honest intent and the untested assumptions of what lay ahead.

1. Weekly meetings with site coordinators, facilitated by the deputy director, to share information relevant to positive adolescent development and to clarify issues related to the developmental progress of youth at their sites;
2. Weekly scheduled meetings of the SBCC staff and the deputy director to discuss operational issues and problem-solving strategies;
3. Monthly meetings with criminal justice, faith and neighborhood-based partners to discuss problems and progress relevant to adjusting or confirming the elements of the project model;
4. Quarterly, communal “celebrations,” each with a theme related to SBCC progress. Communal gathering attendees would include project participating youth, siblings, coaches, mentors, criminal justice agency actors, and the press. Formal and informal informational presentations, accompanied by the sharing of a community meal, would build cohesion; expand socially constructive networks; inform community members about the accomplishments of the project and invite input regarding project shortcomings as well as celebrate achievements; recruit new volunteers; and identify new opportunities for the development of SBCC, youth, and caretakers.

9 Using a pre-packaged program, purchased by the Deputy at the beginning of his tenure, the Executive and Deputy Directors devoted considerable time, beginning in December 2013, to completing the MIS and programming it for functionality. The process was completed in February 2014, when the MIS became functional.
The time and rigor devoted to the yearlong planning process notwithstanding, implementation of CCFY’s pilot project was beset by challenges. Some of the challenges were the product of flawed assumptions that were embedded in the initial logic model. These remained undetected until well into the first year of implementation and were, in a few instances, serious enough to threaten the integrity of the project model. Others, less threatening, were brought about by internal and external contextual conditions. The most glaring example was the change in the state’s (and therefore the city’s) juvenile arrest and detention policies as the first year of project implementation drew to a close. The liberalization of juvenile arrest and detention policies went unannounced and unexplained for several months, leaving SBCC staff perplexed and anxious about the inexplicable drop in the rate of referrals, until late spring 2012.

Still other challenges were introduced by the standard operating procedures typical of justice system bureaucracies, which, when combined with unresolved organizational issues, stymied progress. Most people in the non-profit world are familiar with bureaucracies — at least in the abstract. While operating procedures within a project can be unique, a familiarity with the standard operating procedures of the agencies one relies on for cooperation is essential. A bane of conscientious community-based practitioners is “why ‘such-and-such’ is not happening, when and how it has been promised in a signed MOU.”

The challenges identified above, often intertwined and overlapping, went unrecognized or unresolved for months. They were rooted in good intentions, good will, and unflagging commitment, but some on staff were led astray by inexperience and misguided loyalties, and still others by confusion between leadership and good management. Once identified, however, the challenges were acknowledged, and, most important, the solutions were creative enough to provide new meaning to the phrase: “They can make lemonade out of sour lemons.”

The narrative that follows relies on the most illustrative of SBCC’s implementation experiences to clarify the challenges and barriers faced by grassroots groups that make project implementation difficult. Throughout the narrative, it is important to keep two key facts in mind: First, each of the challenges was acknowledged and eventually addressed with solutions. Often, the solutions became a value-added response. Second, despite the focus on implementation stresses, all outcomes by October 2013 were poised in a positive direction, with the juvenile recidivism outcome demonstrating statistical significance, albeit too weak for celebration. In short, the collection of suggestively positive outcomes supports confidence in the potential of the project model.

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10 See, for example, Malcolm Feeley, The Process is the Punishment, 1979, Russell Sage Foundation.
Flawed Assumptions

A signed MOU between implementers and administrators in participating public agencies defines the realities of cooperation.

As discussed briefly in the Introduction, CCFY’s initial “vision” was to identify youngsters on the cusp of adolescence who, because of antisocial attitudes and behaviors as observed by neighborhood law enforcement and other “influential(s),” were headed for trouble. Implementation strategy called for SBCC program staff to identify potential juvenile participants from lists provided by juvenile officers from neighborhood precincts, the Housing Authority police, and school safety officers, as well as from members of the faith community and the lay public.

Reality dictated otherwise: While those approached agreed with the referral strategy in theory, lay people wished to avoid “finger-pointing,” while law enforcement officers preferred to avoid making such judgments. Because everyone contacted supported the project plan and tried to be encouraging, their hesitancy to follow through with referrals didn’t surface until the expected lists failed to surface.

SBCC project plans were familiar to juvenile justice stakeholders at City Hall. Policy, advisory, and task force meetings hosted by the Mayor’s Office of the Criminal Justice Coordinator were frequent, and the Executive Director of CCFY was a consistent invitee and attendee. He was also a substantive and respected contributor to other organized discussions, skillfully interweaving the goals and strategies of the pilot project into general discussions. It wasn’t long before established stakeholders sought his counsel and respected his advice.

The respect achieved by the Executive Director was well deserved; he was informed, thoughtful, and engagingly frank — backed up by the large and impressive DCJS contract. A referral process involving the Bronx Family Prosecutors — a division of the city’s Corporation Counsel (more commonly spoken of as “Corp. Counsel,” or the New York City Law Department) — was particularly encouraged by city criminal justice policymakers, since that was, at the time, the final stop for juveniles before case adjudication in Family Court.

An MOU was approved and signed with Corp. Counsel (see Appendix C for an example of the project operating agreements later signed by additional juvenile justice agencies). Bronx Family Court prosecutors were pleased to have a constructive alternative to filing petitions which often resulted in disappointing outcomes. The pilot met several needs; in many cases, it was important to stakeholders to keep juveniles out of court, and it was important to Corp. Counsel to have a measure of accountability within the community. The proposed arrangement met needs for both agencies.

At the beginning of July, 2011, SBCC staff awaited project referrals, anticipating 100 referrals by the end of the first implementation year. This was based on referrals in the first quarter of Implementation Year 1 (7-9/2011) might be explained by the advent of the second quarter of Year 1 (10-12, 2011) was also disappointing. Still more disappointing, the sluggish referrals were underscored by only six referrals in the next quarter. In fact, the referrals during the next half-year did nothing to alleviate SBCC’s anxiety. (See Figure 2, SBCC Referrals by Agency)

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11 This “vision” was predicated on statistics from the 40th precinct, which indicated a robust increase in juvenile arrests between the ages of 12 and 15, in 2009 and 2010.
Figure 2.

SBCC Referrals by Agency
July 1, 2011 – December 31, 2013
n=149
Year 2 figures suggested a more encouraging rate of referrals by Spring, 2012. The 2013 referrals were, however, accompanied by SBCC’s first real recognition that changes in juvenile arrest and detention policies had taken place, without notification from any of the several juvenile justice administrators who had, by Year 2, also become a signatory to the MOUs.

In fact, much time and effort was spent explaining the project and the referral process within each additional agency that became an MOU signatory. When the referral rate showed little improvement, administrators who had signed the MOUs were contacted, but neither explanatory information nor fresh data — though promised — were forthcoming. While waiting for explanations, SBCC staff worked with line staff in each agency to determine the causes for the paucity of referrals. Not surprisingly, the time spent at each agency site, trying to problem solve, interfered with SBCC’s completion of other necessary tasks.

**Criminal justice agency administrators who become party to a collaboration with non-agency implementers will be responsible for oversight.**

What was learned from monitoring agency performance relevant to the signed MOUs was that juvenile justice agency line staff was not always aware of SBCC operational protocols, and sometimes were unaware of the project itself, automatically eliminating it as a possible referral option. Police officers, in particular, change shifts and assignments frequently, so that briefing the officer in charge on Wednesday might not transfer to Thursday’s officer in charge. Moreover, each agency had its own culture tied to rewards (promotions) and punishment (fringe status). SBCC staff learned that a signed MOU between a grassroots provider and a justice agency is necessary but not sufficient to ensure collaboration — especially when the collaborative process involves a change in standard operating procedure.

Realizing that they could not take the execution of the agreed upon protocols for granted, it became necessary for SBCC to dedicate one of its own staff members to maintain a consistent presence in the criminal justice agencies to facilitate referrals. Not surprisingly, the collaborative problem-solving time spent with each of the agencies interfered with staff ability to complete other tasks.

**An “evidence-based” intervention assures positive outcomes.**

Reportedly weak in terms of supportive social networks and parenting skills, SBCC parents and caretakers were considered well served with an evidence-based program focused on parenting skills. Early adolescence was generally stressful for parents and their children; this was surely the case in Mott Haven, since most of the participants were expected to be from single parent families, anecdotally reported first and later empirically corroborated. (See Figure 11, page 38.) In addition, parenting skills workshops, preceded by a communal meal, could provide an encouraging setting for strengthening social networks.

Importantly, DCJS funders initially advocated for the use of “evidence-based” programs. Quarterly contract reports repeatedly requested information relevant to their use, and potential funders uniformly expressed an interest in an applicant’s receptivity to using one. Selecting an evidence-based program from among the annotated bibliographies was a straightforward route to cooperating with the preferences of funders and securing “the best” for Mott Haven. In short, SBCC naively assumed success and positive change in parent/child relationships, based simply on the Strengthening Family Program’s (SFP) evidence-based status.

Having gone through a careful selection process; the SFP’s three-day training workshops; and time and additional funds spent with consultants (who were willing to translate SFP worksheets into Spanish for less than that charged by SFP developers), SBCC felt that the parenting component of its project was “well in hand.” However, several related issues placed the assumption about the infallibility of an evidence-based program in doubt.

First, neither the developer’s training workshops nor SBCC’s family support staff was sufficient for the facilitation tasks at hand. Second, the duration of the SFP curriculum — 14 consecutive sessions, each session lasting three hours — was too demanding for Mott Haven parents and children. Third, while the SFP is generally “culturally sensitive,” there are nuances within a cultural group that may prompt responses and behaviors that fall outside the norm for the group as a whole. For example, there are differences within a group assumed to be homogeneous that are attributable to varying rates of acculturation, family backgrounds, time
of immigration, educational background prior to immigration, etc. When the assembled group is small, as SBCC’s initial group was, subgroup differences and influence can predominate, if not skillfully handled by a facilitator.

In the present case, the SFP lessons and attendance were negatively affected by the airing of unresolved trauma on the part of a subgroup of attendees. The SBCC Family Coordinator, an initial facilitator, lent the subgroup a sympathetic ear. However, the frequency with which interruptions occurred stifled lesson relevant discussions for others, and ate away at the time allotted to complete the curriculum.

Follow up training was available from the SFP developers, but when the costs were explained, they were prohibitively expensive. Roles and responsibilities were adjusted, and SBCC special consultants facilitated SFP workshops that followed. The consultants, though not trained by SFP developers, were purportedly familiar with, and practiced at, delivering family strengthening curricula. Nonetheless, their adaptations to the SFP left the issue of whether or not SBCC was using an evidence-based program open to argument.

**Program strategies, activities, and expected outcomes in a strength-based model, are interchangeable with a risk-reduction model.**

Positive Youth Development (PYD), relatively sparse in terms of theory, and not yet in the mainstream of youth development projects, may have prompted SBCC’s faulty assumptions about the “core competencies” expected from a strength-based intervention. It was also true that some publications identified strength-based outcomes in “risk-reduction” terms. The Youth Coordinator, responsible for intake assessments; coach, mentor, youth progress; and crisis management, was professionally trained in risk-centered approaches. He was accustomed to focusing on risk reduction as evidence of pro-social development.

SBCC’s gradual but increasing conceptual drift from a “strength-based” model to a “risk-centered” one was further reinforced by the DCJS funder. The program officer explained that the DCJS was trying to establish a statewide inventory of juvenile risk. Therefore, training and certification in the administration and scoring of the YASI risk assessment instrument was required of all contractors and grantees. In fact, SBCC’s quarterly reports to the funder requested an accounting of the number of YASI’s administered during the quarter, along with a summary of participant risk.

Coaches and their cadre of younger adult mentors expressed confusion about the deficit focus of the initial Youth Coordinator’s bi-weekly meetings. They also expressed concern about responding to the structured guides they were supposed to use to comment on the risk reduction behavior they observed while working with participants, since they were intuitively uncomfortable with the risk-reduction approach.

On the other hand, the Youth Coordinator’s comfort with the assumption that outcomes of a strength-based intervention negated objectified risk, innocently mounted a challenge to the essence of SBCC’s and the project’s vision. In addition, the innocent challenge introduced tensions among project staff and partners, raised painful questions about staff competence, and, of course, created confusion.

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Change in the External Environment: An Alteration in Juvenile Arrest Policy

Considering the flawed assumptions discussed in the previous section, and the paucity of referrals, 2012 was — borrowing a regal phrase — an “annus horribilis.” There was no way that SBCC would be able to achieve its goal of 100 participants by July 1, 2012. Something vital to SBCC’s survival had gone awry.

With few exceptions, SBCC staff, observing the referral process with justice agency personnel, had found few eligible participants “slipping through bureaucratic cracks.” Further inquiries made by the lead agency (CCFY) confirmed that “numbers were down across all justice agencies,” but administrators shared no insights or suggestions. Direct requests for revelatory data went unanswered, but reassurances provided a calming effect.

The reality of the change in juvenile arrest and detention policy dawned at a Juvenile Justice Advisory Group meeting in Albany during the spring of 2012. The lead agency’s Executive Director had been invited to attend the Juvenile Justice Advisory Group meeting as a presenter. Powerpoint illustrations (see Appendix D) demonstrated SBCC’s participant length of engagement; probation mandate completions; and an observed correlation between parental involvement in the SFP and juvenile length of engagement — each slide accompanied by approving nods from those assembled.

The data presentation that followed SBCC’s was prepared by the DCJS Office of Strategic Planning and Analysis. The DCJS data empirically demonstrated significant reductions in juvenile arrests, detention, petitions, and out-of-home placements. Kudos from the Advisory Group chair were forthcoming; detention facilities had been closed and out-of-home placements had been significantly reduced. Given the severe fiscal constraints facing the state, its agencies, and localities, the congratulatory messaging was certainly welcome.

A bit baffled by the tone of the messaging, since there was no mention of positive socio-ecological change that might have caused the sudden reduction in the size of the official juvenile delinquency population, the lead agency’s Executive Director acknowledged the possibility that SBCC’s paucity of referrals was a reflection of a systemic change in juvenile arrest and detention policy. His attention quickly focused on mitigating the negative effects that the change in policy was having on the flow of SBCC juvenile referrals.

Relying on an uncanny ability to think positively and creatively when recognizing a challenge, the Executive Director pro-actively moved to increase the rate of participant referrals. While the outcomes of his pro-active determination are discussed in the following outcome sections, the open loop regarding the cause for the sudden drop in juvenile arrests and detention was officially closed during the months that followed.

The reality of the change in juvenile arrest policy was casually acknowledged by newly appointed police officers to the juvenile unit, during a SBCC staff member’s visit to the neighborhood precinct (December, 2012). At that time, the staff member, also new to her SBCC assignment, wished to become familiar with the process the local precinct was using to identify potential referrals. The process was reviewed by a new officer, who first explained the “screening process” applied to juvenile arrestees by the department. Now, prior to lodging a formal complaint, a phone call was made to a central number located “downtown.” The call was to establish whether or not a youth’s present transgression, when combined with his or her prior history, warranted the filing of an actual charge or was to conclude with a more benign “juvenile report,” to be kept on file. The “Report” enabled the youth to return to life in the neighborhood, as usual (See Appendix E). The filing of a charge(s), as opposed to a Report, would move the case to Bronx juvenile probation for further case assessment and decision making. If the case survived probation’s scrutiny, it progressed to the office of the Bronx Corp. Counsel (the Bronx unit representing NYC’s Law Department) where the case was deemed ripe or not for formal adjudication — each agency taking note of the more relaxed policy guiding its decision making.

In May 2013, while attending another JJAG meeting, the Executive Director was privy to a handout with official data for 2012. Juvenile arrests in the Bronx had been reduced by 35% in 2012, a sizable reduction from 2010, when CCFY used official data to select its target neighborhood and juvenile population of

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13 Queen Elizabeth II, November 24th, 1992, in a speech to the Guild Hall.

14 It should be noted that despite SBCC’s designation of juvenile justice agencies as project “partners,” they were NOT program partners. In the same sense as were the site-specific neighborhood coaches and their cadre of mentors.
interest. System intakes (juvenile probation) followed similarly, while Corp. Counsel (family court delinquency prosecutions) petitions fell 20% (See Appendix F). Thus, the change in juvenile arrest and detention policy, ironically a long-standing goal of juvenile justice reformers, became an official and palpable constraint for the SBCC project model at hand.

**Internal Challenges**

**The Lead Agency (CCFY) and the SBCC Pilot Initially Undervalued Need for Technical Assistance in Communities of Chronic Disadvantage**

The intermingling of several implementation challenges has already been noted. The impact from the flawed assumptions discussed above were more negative, for longer than they might otherwise have been, than they would have had CCFY or SBCC been available to provide staff development and technical assistance to partners as soon as a challenge to the project’s core surfaced.

CCFY wrestled early with tensions arising from a double-edged image. Leaving aside the implications related to the unsatisfactory community response to it’s process of identifying neighborhood partners, early data suggested that those selected as partners could, in fact, facilitate adolescent pro-social development. However, the skills and strengths required for measureable impact remained inchoate to objectively measure inputs and outcomes. Could the pilot SBCC “coach” its partners’ performance, much as partner coaches were charged with facilitating the development of neighborhood juveniles?

While the partner (coach) selection process initially proved disappointing, it revealed a gaping need for capacity building among grassroots groups in Mott Haven. SBCC’s actual coach selections, made by default, could be justified based on “prior experience with youth.” However, SBCC had little information regarding the approaches or methods the coaches relied on to achieve positive results with young people. SBCC would need to assess and address 20-year-old habits that may or may not have been as productive as they could have been. Moreover, if the “nascent skills and strengths” upon which SBCC mortgaged its future actually existed, they would need to be developed to the point at which they could be readily believed and were no longer nascent.

Recognizing that there is interplay between socio-ecological context and behavior, one might ask: How did these particular coaches, leading structured civic activities, facilitate juvenile pro-social development? Remember, “coaches” are SBCC’s neighborhood partners, and, as such, are meant to facilitate juvenile pro-social development via the process of participating civic project selection, design, budgeting, problem-solving, project completion, and the sharing of accomplishment with neighborhood residents. These skills were not readily observed in the coaches as they responded to CCFY’s original appeal for SBCC project partners.

Using the slow pace of participant referrals to advantage, the weekly meetings for neighborhood partner coaches held between December 2011 and April 2012 were devoted to technical assistance. A newly hired Deputy Director to serve SBCC (October 2011) facilitated the discussions. To begin, the new Deputy placed a priority on building a functional “team approach” to youth coaching at SBCC. Short- and longer-term plans covered issues specific to the multi-faceted concept of “community improvement”:

- Meaningful activities were carefully related to strength-based juvenile development and civic projects;
- Coordinating youth activities across sites became a goal;
- Sharing best practices was a regular feature of the discussion; and other capacity-building issues related to the pro-social development of juveniles using civic projects were addressed.

These bi-weekly “learning table” discussions, facilitated by the Deputy, were supplemented with overnight retreats at appealing venues not too far from home, where SBCC staff and coaches could comfortably exchange ideas and concerns. In addition to the affirming bi-weekly learning tables, other grassroots providers in the neighborhood, some of whom unsuccessfully struggled with SBCC’s RFP, and others whose word-of-mouth connections informed them about the assistance SBCC was offering, attended several training and technical assistance workshops held at rotating venues. These workshops, facilitated by two SBCC consultants and a third SBCC new hire,

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15 Although the data was flawed, data illustrated in Appendix E suggested that positive outcomes were materializing.
16 Neighborhood partners were selected, subsequent to issues that surfaced during a cumbersome “RFP” process. Each of the partners had a history of engagement with neighborhood youth, and brought to the SBCC table a cadre of young adults who now volunteered as “mentors”.
17 The new Deputy Director replaced the initial Project Director.
18 Meeting worksheets were adopted from materials offered by the National Gender & Equity Campaign: Exploring Values.
covered topics such as grant writing; board member roles and responsibilities, board selection, budgeting, legal issues, and community outreach activities.

With one exception, learning table discussions were enthusiastically supported. They were observably productive, and coaches — perhaps by coincidence, perhaps from the affirmation and support from trusted neighborhood “insiders,” or perhaps from an appreciation of other grassroots groups who were becoming part of a developing, mutually supportive network — re-kindled their motivation, exhibiting a re-invigorated interest in the CCFY/SBCC mission and in its participants. It wasn’t long before coaches were thinking about “community improvement” as a multi-layered concept, requiring an intergenerational, intra-group team approach.

By the final quarter of Implementation Year 2, SBCC participants had completed a neighborhood mural honoring a community leader. A Youth Leadership Curriculum was developed and made its debut at a presentation to current and potential funders and parents. Later it was presented to local school assemblies, and, in Year 3, to the “New Jim Crow” invitational conference in the state capitol. A youth organized and staffed Neighborhood Talent Show, and a Small Business Enterprise, which grew and sold fresh produce to neighbors, employed (with some financial assistance from SBCC) many SBCC youth during the summer months bridging Years 2 & 3.

An additional project is worth singling out because its planning and execution engendered a more demanding level of complexity than those that preceded it, and because it is emblematic of the intra-site collaboration that was developing at SBCC. The “Youth Against Street Violence” effort was initiated at an intra-site youth retreat, held during the summer bridging years 2 & 3. Youth participants attending the retreat expressed their fear of street violence, which was particularly acute over the weekends.

The youth’s antidote to street violence was to plan for a series of “Teen Friday Nites.” These events consisted of music, dancing, and games for the more timid. Teen Friday Nites evolved with assistance across all sites. Helpful suggestions came from all of the coaches, and many youth and mentors volunteered to serve on committees. In addition to SBCC’s sponsorship, Save Our Streets (SOS), another neighborhood grassroots group, asked to partner with SBCC for this endeavor. Thus, SBCC participants joined with neighborhood mainstream youth to plan and staff every aspect of Teen Friday Nites — from coat checking, to lighting, DJ’s, refreshments, and cleanup — for more than six months.

Examining the current research on adolescent pro-social development, which includes mentoring, youth organizing, and resiliency studies, the SBCC project might fruitfully be considered to fall within a category of intervention that Trickett (2009) identifies as “one that integrates a multi-layered ecological concept of the neighborhood, a commitment to working in collaboration, or partnership with local groups and settings, and an appreciation for how an intervention can be successfully situated in a local culture and context.” Based on Trickett, the approach encompasses the strategies that have empirically demonstrated positive developmental impacts on youth, adults, and the neighborhoods in which participants live.

*Avoidable joined unavoidable delays developing the MIS. Lack of experience with data collection and entry prolonged dysfunction, challenged problem-recognition and project management, and diminished the integrity of claimed and expected outcomes.*

The technical consultant hired during the planning year was given the task of designing and testing an interactive database. Within range of completion, the technical consultant’s subcontract was terminated, albeit on friendly terms. This occurred because the Deputy Director believed that he could modify a pre-packaged program with which he was familiar. The modified program was described as able to meet the needs of SBCC management and evaluation teams. The Deputy claimed that his modifications would accomplish the required MIS tasks for less money than that required to complete the consultant’s subcontract.19

Suffice to say, this was not the case. In addition to the loss of time and effort the Deputy might have devoted more productively to SBCC personnel and coach/mentor development, there were other managerial tasks put on "hold." Weekly learning table meetings became inconsistent; progress and activity data was neither systematically collected nor entered, leaving the information required for weekly

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19 It is meaningful to note that the technical consultant had reviewed this, and other, pre-packaged programs prior to deciding on an original design. The cost of modifying the prepackaged programs was equal to that for an original design, but at that point, could not provide the interactivity of an original design. The limitations of a pre-packaged program were later eliminated, and the MIS became fully functional in February, 2014.
managerial assessments unavailable. Without data, the learning table agendas were not well planned or administered. Even when critical concerns were raised, systematic follow-up was deferred or lost in a flurry of catch-up activities.

The remaining issue of timely data production, brought to a head by the need for analytic data for a final Phase I report, was handled with several months of what were called “Data Fridays.” These workdays concentrated all staff efforts on updating, cleaning, and entering pre-determined data.

There were several meaningful discoveries as staff entered data that were sometimes many months old. For example, the carelessness with which participation and attendance data were kept exacerbated issues related to the realities of participant engagement. Inconsistencies in participation numbers, when combined with inattention to attendance, data lapses, and inaccuracies, played havoc with the statistical analysis and with the surety of reported outcomes. After accounting and adjusting for inaccuracies and inconsistencies, it was determined that between July 2011 and November 2013, there were only 62 juveniles who had been programatically engaged (with only one absence in any given month) for at least 60 days. Another 15 juveniles had sporadic attendance of 60 days or less.

The small sample size, which had been obscured by inconsistent data, should have been recognized earlier so that an informed decision concerning the cost/benefit of the planned statistical analysis could have taken place. The small sample was clearly an analytical constraint and was directly responsible for the timidity of a key outcome response — recidivism.

In a related vein, problem-solving with regard to the attendance lapses of a significant number of youth, had they been known, might have brought the number of participants closer to a viable sample. Ignoring evaluation needs, one can only imagine the benefits that might have accrued to those youngsters whose attendance lapses would have been constructively addressed by a coach, a mentor, SBCC staff, or all of them.

The examples cited above are emblematic, merely scratching the surface of a litany of issues that might have been more constructively addressed had timely and accurate data prompted discussion. As discussed in the following section, a fully functional, well-designed and interactive MIS is an indispens-
Forward momentum was difficult during the first implementation year. In fact, the conceptual drift from a “strength-focused” project to a risk reduction model was due, in part, to the absence of an individual, who understood the theoretical foundations of the project and could exercise capacity building and supervisory skills.

The Executive Director first recognized that the project was stagnating and then recognized the impossibility of resolving the problems with the original staff, especially when considering his out-of-office commitments. The required staff changes, beginning with the hiring of a Deputy Director to replace the Project Director worked well until he was overwhelmed with subsidiary tasks. Repeating a questionable pattern, the Executive Director turned to his Advisory Board for an experienced manager and found one in yet another trusted, long-time personal friend. With one observable exception, the usurpation of the MIS, and some staff “grumblings” that were stored rather than ignored, the appointment of a Deputy Director worked well for the remainder of the year.

Figure 3. Community Connections for Youth (Year 1: July 2010 – June 2011)

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The former Project Director, the Youth Coordinator, and the new Deputy Director had been professional colleagues and friends of the Executive Director. They all shared a common vision, had life experiences in common, and were meaningfully bonded. However, the Executive Director ascribed some of his own skill sets, as well as those necessary to effective SBCC teaming, to friends with whom he personally identified, without evidence that necessary skills, in fact, existed. This form of positive identification with “needed” others may have been an unrecognized form of “projective identification” (Melanie Klein, 1946). To the extent that this was true, it added challenges to the leadership and managerial processes.
CCFY’s structure changed somewhat to accommodate adjusted organizational vision. Though still a centrifugal force for neighborhood capacity building, technical assistance focused on seeding new projects for additional neighborhood providers could now be acknowledged as placing the cart before the horse.

The importance of and the demands imposed by training and technical assistance for chronically disadvantaged communities was driven home by several additional contracts awarded to CCFY, some of them from city agencies and others from private foundations. These contracts, awarded in contemplation of increased juvenile home placements, were financially advantageous and elevated training and technical assistance to a new level of importance, both in reality and in the eyes of CCFY’s entrepreneurial Executive Director.

One of the three initial SBCC staff became a full time trainer for CCFY. The new Deputy Director initiated a search for additional SBCC staff to nurture justice system partners, encourage juvenile referrals, and improve and monitor youth programming and delivery. The search process involved everyone — SBCC staff and coaches — and culminated in consensual choices and an era of good feelings within the organization.

The new staff selection process reinforced a general appreciation and respect for the value of “teaming.” Participant intake could be completed at a referral site, circumventing the hassle that always accompanied an “appointment” route. By teaming with the SBCC Family Coordinator, parental permission and youth intake could be simultaneous. And, perhaps most beneficial, coaches (with one exception) were now automatically part of everyone’s team.

One post-evaluation perspective is that this time period represented the “blossoming” of the SBCC’s neighborhood capacity building vision. Using the slow pace of participant referrals (fall, 2011; winter, 2012) to advantage, the new Deputy Director held technical assistance meetings and learning tables for partner coaches. Plans were to continue these on a bi-weekly basis, covering the multi-faceted concept of community improvement, the application of positive youth development principles in neighborhood settings, values clarification activities, youth priorities, the characteristics of meaningful civic projects, the coordination of youth centered activities across sites, and so on. The bi-weekly learning table discussions were also becoming one of several training and technical assistance venues serving the broader neighborhood.

Learning table discussions were enthusiastically supported; they were well prepared and observably productive. Coaches, perhaps by coincidence, perhaps from re-kindled motivation, exhibited a re-invigorated interest in the CCFY/SBCC mission and in its participants. Young adolescents were taking a more active role in the selection of projects and were initiating retreats. Coaches began talking about “community improvement” as a multi-layered concept requiring an intergenerational team approach.

What took place at these bi-weekly learning table discussions went beyond the conceptual. Logistic concerns were new to these “partners.” In addition to retreats, they were taking young people to new places (like movies in Manhattan) and celebrating birthdays beyond the confines of Mott Haven. The Deputy Director incorporated elements of financial planning, travel, and parental permission into learning table discussions. He and a newly hired staff person developed templates that would guide coaches as they planned for a new, or expanded civic project or event. Importantly, the templates developed for the neighborhood partners followed an outline that could be used for grant writing and proposal development.

Unfortunately, this era of positive activity did not last long. There wasn’t one particular situation responsible for the wilting of the blossom; it was a combination of expedience, events, additional challenges, and decisions that challenged the tenets of effective SBCC management and CCFY leadership.

First, CCFY was expanding the SBCC project into a contiguous neighborhood, anchored by the 44th police precinct. Neighborhood partnerships and coaches needed to expand, as well as SBCC staff responsibilities. Second, two large, demanding and sought after proposals needed quality time from the Executive Director, a new Administrative Assistant, and the Deputy Director who, having staked his claim to the MIS, was charged with producing the charts, the graphs, and tables that would be used to support the new proposals. The tendency was for the Deputy and Executive Directors to work together to produce the necessary data for the proposals and

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21 Ensuing discussions, either in meetings, or with individuals, framed the “teaming” concept in terms that presaged an expansion of the “partnership” concept.
power point presentations. In fact, marketing presentations constituted their own challenges; invitational presentations ate up considerable managerial time, thanks to the incomplete status of the MIS and the work styles of the two Directors.

Invitational meetings, alluded to in a previous section having to do with the Executive Director’s networking/marketing skills, were occurring at an increasing rate. In addition to the presentational meetings that accompanied the submission of written proposals, presentations to interested visitors and at professional workshops and meetings consumed the Director’s time in and out of the office. Discussions ensued over the costs and benefits of participation in these meetings. The Executive Director now believed that training and the opportunities for expansion were far more lucrative for CCFY than its direct service projects. In fact, the training and technical assistance provided from independent contracts helped supplement (and often complemented) the time and effort devoted to youth, family, and neighborhood strengthening direct services.

Nearing the end of the DCJS contract, CCFY had to prepare for and undergo a financial audit, as is generally required. CCFY had, in addition to an administrative assistant, a part-time financial person and a clerk/secretary. As had by now become a CCFY standard operating procedure, the Deputy Director was drafted from SBCC to take the lead on the complex tasks associated with the audit process. Whether or not audit preparation took advantage of effective teaming remains questionable. Suffice to say, there was criticism of the process from SBCC staff.
**CCFY/SBCC Internal Outcomes**

CCFY has selected and retained, with small financial incentives and greater professional and personal rewards, an active body of community coaches and mentors who have become pro-active SBCC partners, fully committed to the pro-social development of system-acquainted juveniles. (See Coach Sites and Their Mentors: 2010 – 2013, Table 2. Below)

Surrendering to contextual realities, the CCFY decision-makers, initially pragmatic, chose four (N=4) neighborhood-based, youth-focused providers with whom they were familiar.22 CCFY’s practical choices were easily rationalized: the new partners were both experienced and willing to serve as “coaches” as well as site coordinators. This saved considerable time in terms of outreach and recruitment and training. Further, the new partner/coaches already had a pool of peer mentors, recruited by them as staff on prior projects.

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22 One of the four partners died during the implementation process. The other three coaches absorbed his participants.

### Table 1.

Coach Sites and Their Mentors: 2010 – 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coach Last Name</th>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Months as Coach</th>
<th>Start Month</th>
<th>End Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rivera (SC)</td>
<td>Betances Community Center</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Oct-11</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caban</td>
<td>Betances Community Center</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>May-12</td>
<td>Feb-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardona</td>
<td>Betances Community Center</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Jan-12</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gonzales</td>
<td>Betances Community Center</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jan-12</td>
<td>Feb-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gushin</td>
<td>Betances Community Center</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Dec-12</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negron</td>
<td>Betances Community Center</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivera</td>
<td>Betances Community Center</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>May-12</td>
<td>Jan-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figueroa (SC)</td>
<td>Freedom/Brook Park</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Oct-11</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talib (coach)</td>
<td>Freedom/Brook Park</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Aug-12</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coley</td>
<td>Freedom Community Center</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nov-11</td>
<td>Jan-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talib (SC)</td>
<td>FUSED</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Jul-13</td>
<td>Dec-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perez</td>
<td>FUSED</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Jul-13</td>
<td>Nov-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra (SC)</td>
<td>Jehovah Shammah</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Oct-11</td>
<td>Dec-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gonzalez</td>
<td>Jehovah Shammah</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Oct-11</td>
<td>Feb-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saltos</td>
<td>Jehovah Shammah</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Oct-14</td>
<td>Feb-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hudgins</td>
<td>United Playaz of New York (UP)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>May-13</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramos</td>
<td>United Playaz of New York (UP)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aug-13</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simmons</td>
<td>United Playaz of New York (UP)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>May-13</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walker</td>
<td>United Playaz of New York (UP)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nov-13</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>United Playaz of New York (UP)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>May-13</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acevedo (SC)</td>
<td>YUCA</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Oct-14</td>
<td>Dec-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banz</td>
<td>YUCA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>May-13</td>
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<td>Griffin</td>
<td>YUCA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mar-13</td>
<td>Aug-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard</td>
<td>YUCA</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Jan-12</td>
<td>Dec-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King</td>
<td>YUCA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nov-11</td>
<td>Apr-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sealy</td>
<td>YUCA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>May-12</td>
<td>Jul-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taitt</td>
<td>YUCA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Apr-12</td>
<td>Nov-12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SBCC coaches and mentors differ somewhat from the descriptions and definitions found in the research literature. Further, the relationships formed between coaches and SBCC, and between coaches and juvenile project participants differed from those initially conceptualized by project developers. They were not neighborhood residents working at full or part-time jobs who, in response to faith-based efforts or flyers in supermarkets or apartment house lobbies, felt an urge to give back to their community by mentoring a recalcitrant teenager. Coaches were engaged in proprietary entrepreneurial activities or had a history of non-profit youth leadership or advocacy activities. The more traditional identification was apropos of the mentors who grew up in the neighborhood and, having reached young adulthood relatively unscathed, wished to continue their relationship with the group they give credit to for their jobs, their high school diplomas, and their college attendance. Because they have experienced similar traumas, similarly negative experiences in neighborhood schools, and similar familial conflict as the SBCC participants — and survived well enough to contemplate an improving future — SBCC mentors are wonderful adjuncts to the more mature “father figures” who serve the project as partners/coaches/crisis managers.

Unlike traditional programs in which a “mentor” may serve a limited number of youth for a set number of hours each week, SBCC coaches spend, more or less, the equivalent of another full time experience at their sites. Their special brand of “expertise”, in evidence at each of the sites, provides the basis of their importance; SBCC is the avocation that they now share, voluntarily, with partners. Their mentors, as familiar with the coaches with whom they work as they are with the stresses of the juvenile participants, may come and go as frequently as do traditional program mentors, but the impact of their inconsistency on program participants is cushioned by the stable participation of coaches and site interactivity now encouraged among juveniles, coaches, and mentors.

Families in neighborhoods of chronic disadvantage are often in crisis. It is not uncommon for a coach, or a member of the SBCC staff, to receive a distress call at any time during the day or night. These calls act as a smoke signal; they prompt additional calls to other members of what has become a “crisis management team.” A participant’s coach, if not the recipient of the initial call, is automatically included, as part of naturally occurring team. Thus, for example, one might find a group of family members, an SBCC youth, a coach, and two SBCC staff members at a hastily scheduled emergency court appearance. Similarly, a coach, the SBCC Family Services Coordinator, a youth, and a parent might appear together at a school conference, trying to constructively resolve a potentially destructive issue. Since any given coach may be unable to break away at a moment of crisis, it is not unusual for one coach to summon another, who also has an established relationship with the youth in question. Coaches working in tandem and in crisis management teams with SBCC staff have expanded the partnership concept, considerably beyond the commitment defined by their MOUs.
To the extent that nascent strengths in communities of chronic disadvantage exist, they remain inchoate in the absence of support, skill development, guidance, and the personal security of acceptance from insiders with whom they comfortably identify. Thus, the lead agency (CCFY) has established a Community Institute for Technical Assistance and Training.

CCFY’s new Training and Technical Assistance contract, from the city Department of Probation, institutionalizes an adjunctive component to the SBCC model. The new Institute will soon represent the capacity building resources for Bronx probation officers and parents hoping to demonstrate that “home” can be, with constructive support, a better place to socialize anti-social juveniles than a detention facility or an out-of-home placement.

Ironically, the training and technical assistance provided adjunctively to SBCC parents and providers ignited the neighborhood’s appetite for more intensive “capacity building.” Project developers were correct: There are nascent skills and talents within neighborhoods of chronic disadvantage. However, while staff was learning that nascent skills and talents could not be functionally realized without training and ongoing support from “neighbors” with the capacity to provide it, the training unit remained in the background. Adding to the irony was that the distraction created by treating training and technical assistance as a lucrative but not too demanding an adjunct to the project’s core vision may now, with the Executive Director’s applied attention, become a critical component of SBCC and new projects.

A second neighborhood, encompassing the 44th precinct, was added to the neighborhood surrounding the 40th, thanks to a grant from the Pinkerton Foundation to support SBCC’s expansion. (See Figures 4 and 5)

The suggestion that SBCC consider the 44th precinct as a particularly appropriate SBCC neighborhood was first made by the Director of the Bronx Corp Counsel’s Office, early in the implementation process. There were several reasons why the suggestion did not take root until nearly a year later.

Within the following year, many of the operational constraints referred to earlier in this report had been appropriately addressed. In addition to the resolution of troublesome staff issues and the creation of a stable organizational climate the Pinkerton Foundation awarded an additional grant, solely for SBCC’s expansion into the 44th precinct.
neighborhood base now expanded, SBCC systematically planned how best to increase neighborhood grassroots partnerships. Having learned a lot from its prior experience with grassroots partner selection, the Executive Director used a thoughtfully prepared planning document to prompt thorough staff discussions at the staff meetings scheduled to follow.23

As laudable as were the work-plan document and the ensuing SBCC staff discussions, the search for new grassroots partners didn’t measure up to the quality of either. Nonetheless, the bottom line is that SBCC was two coaches richer than before the expansion. One of the two new coaches had been a mentor at one of the original SBCC sites, and the second had been one of the new hires, now with a site and youth program of her own. Thus, the reality and the outcomes for the expansion remain ambiguous as of the present date, there’s no gainsaying that SBCC is addicted to lemonade, not lemons!

Unambiguously, the inclusion of the middle school as an additional referral partner expands SBCC conceptually and, hopefully, numerically. To the extent that SBCC is able to move beyond the justice system for its adolescent referrals, the closer it comes to its original vision: A primary prevention intervention that could productively engage adolescents in pro-social development activities prior to, as well as immediately following, justice system involvement.

**SBCC External Outcomes**

SBCC has established an excellent and growing reputation among professional, bureaucratic, and lay constituencies. These include juvenile components of the criminal justice system, neighborhoods within the South Bronx, juvenile service providers within Mott Haven, progressive administrators from local schools, the private foundation community, the local academic community, and the NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services. Outcomes involving these partnerships can be directly attributed to the SBCC project, as outlined below.

**Juvenile Justice System**

*External events provided a context in flux, ripe for the exercise of leadership and people skills capable of garnering trust that translates into operational support and additional funds for growth and expansion.*

CCFY’s Executive Director had enjoyed the recognition of citywide juvenile justice system administrators prior to the advent of the SBCC. His professional reputation and consistent presence at meetings of the Mayor’s Advisory Council on Juvenile Justice, as well as at a plethora of other state and local gatherings of the juvenile justice community, provided growing recognition, and opportunities were fully recognized.

The advent of SBCC, because it was one of the more sizable DCJS awards, and because it provided a performance platform on which the mettle of the CCFY Executive Director could be tested, altered the playing field. His having utilized many juvenile justice meetings as a platform to disseminate SBCC project plans drew interest from several city administrators and academics. The Mayor’s Office of the Criminal Justice Coordinator became actively involved in facilitating the evaluation component of the SBCC project. The facilitation is particularly noteworthy because it was unsolicited, and because help obtaining juvenile justice data is a relatively rare occurrence.

The help and assistance from the Mayor’s Office was likely attributable to the esteem in which CCFY’s Executive Director was now held and to SBCC’s potential to add “teeth” to the city’s community-focused changes in juvenile justice policies. These changes — reductions in juvenile arrests, detention, and out-of-home placements — serendipitously provided the architecture upon which SBCC was designed.

*Subsequent to the change in policies, the New York City Department of Probation’s (DOP) involvement with CCFY increased considerably. Not only did the DOP become SBCC’s strongest source of participant referrals, it became a significant supporter of CCFY’s Training and Technical Assistance Institute.*

Progressive in his own right, the Commissioner of Probation grew interested in SBCC after hearing from program assistants about the project’s potential. Willing to put CCFY to the test, the DOP awarded two substantial training and Technical Assistance contracts to CCFY to increase probation officer skills relevant to effective home and community placements. CCFY performance on both those contracts, and anecdotal feedback about SBCC’s project components, prompted the

23 Appendix G, The Expansion Plan document, provides an example of the leadership potential within SBCC.
Commissioner to show his support by suggesting that CCFY consider applying for Social Impact Bond (SIB) funding.

SBCC’s strength-based approaches to pro-social development and the importance of “community” tempered the thinking of the DCJS program officer, relaxing the agency’s reliance on medical, risk-based intervention models.

The requirement that grantees and contractors administer the YASI as part of their intake process was abandoned. A particular DCJS site visit featured several “youth planned and delivered” presentations of the civic work that had been accomplished. Several parents who were also involved in SBCC activities were able to view the demonstrations. Some chose to speak with the program officer, and with unique eloquence, shared their thoughts about SBCC. Shortly thereafter, reporting risk factors in quarterly reports for new intakes was no longer required.

Neighborhoods within the South Bronx

SBCC expansion into the 44th precinct netted two additional coaches (N=5) and three new sites, but a hiatus in consistent technical assistance.

Although the expansion-planning document was a promising start, the document and its related SBCC staff meetings belied the reality of staff performance. First, a partner/coach from the initial neighborhood wished to move his site from there to the 44th, where access to supplies and materials he depended on for his projects was easier. Second, a former mentor wished to develop his own site in the 44th, where he had more entrenched roots and could become the single new coach. The third partner/coach in the 44th was a former SBCC staff person, now anxious to anchor her own youth serving agency.

Linked to the decisions discussed above, much of the time assigned to new partner outreach activities in the 44th was spent in a search for space in which the former SBCC staff person could house her new site. While the expansion resulted in three new neighborhood sites, one site was re-established in the new neighborhood from the prior one. While technically one could refer to two new partners, others might argue that this would be a stretch: No new neighborhood partnerships were actually created within the 44th precinct, since one partner was a transplant, the second had been a mentor, and the third had been a full-time staff member as well as a participant coach, albeit without an official site.

Parents and Other Family Members

The development of social support networks, rather than a “suis generis” outcome of family strengthening groups, arose from the efforts of SBCC staff to engage in social network behavior themselves. Staff included an increasing number of residents into multiple socially driven activities. These activities, some of which were intergenerational, and all of which provided expanding opportunities for new social networks, were the seeds of developing social capital.

Social support is the perception and actuality that one is cared for, has assistance available from other people, and can be part of a supportive social network. SBCC home visits were sometimes made by the Family Support Coordinator alone, on occasion with another member of the SBCC staff, and, during the final year, with neighborhood parents, grandparents, or guardians who, having attended FSP workshops and/or related family group meetings, wished to learn some of the skills they observed in the Family Support Coordinator. These neighborhood volunteers, almost a dozen strong by Year 3, claimed personal satisfaction from helping neighbors and spoke about their wish for some kind of formal training in the future.

Quarterly celebratory events, family meetings, and SBCC official participation at Bronx street events all contributed to igniting a sense of community and opportunity for the development of social support networks.

However, the literature refers to celebratory community events as “mobilizing” — a means of recruiting neighborhood/community residents to engage in activities and strategies designed to improve the quality of life or redress a problem. While mobilizing events are a means to an end, often sought by a lead agency, they are neither the end product, nor the longer-term outcome sought. Thus, the number of celebratory events, or the number of attendees, does little to enhance forward project momentum. These activities, although important because they contribute to cohesion, are most useful when they are a strategic component in a plan that adds various types of volunteers that become involved in purposive work, advancing a longer-term agenda.

On the one hand, although event attendees were enthusiastic participants, SBCC did not leverage its food offerings, book bags, or gifts to strategic advantage. Many were well attended, and those in attendance often added to the roles of Family Group Meetings, but often-unrelated advocacy messages
superseded those relevant to the CCFY/SBCC mission.

On the other hand, celebratory events and Family Group Meetings seeded promising friendships. Nearly two dozen (N=22) women (mothers, grandmothers, and aunts) have been socially connected to one another, creating social linkages where there had been none. These social linkages appear to have been forged during FSP workshops, with a subset of this group having volunteered as co-presenters at other neighborhood community mobilizing events in the Bronx. An even smaller subset has asked to join the Family Coordinator on her home visits, receiving small stipends as they learn skills and contribute to SBCC services.

**Juvenile Participants**

*By the end of October 2013 — during the Fall of the third complete year of project implementation — 62 juveniles out of 151 referred (42%) had been meaningfully engaged at a SBCC site with neighborhood coaches and mentors.*  

After statistically balancing recidivism-related variables between the SBCC group and a Bronx-wide sample of juveniles arrested during the same time period, the **SBCC group of juveniles was significantly less likely to have been re-arrested, or re-charged, within 12 months (p-value *Tx<Ct 0.09)*.

From Referral to Treatment: The size of the treatment group had been a core concern from the beginning of the project. By November, 2013, SBCC had received 151 referrals. Of those, 29 were ineligible, almost all because they lived outside the catchment neighborhoods. Another 37 referrals didn’t complete the intake assessment process, which included an orientation, an intake interview, and a site visit. Eighty-five (85) of the 151 juveniles referred completed intake interviews and had been assigned to a SBCC site. However, of the 85 who began the program, there were 23 whose attendance was brief and/or sporadic, leaving only 62 whose participation was meaningful enough to consider them part of the “treatment” cohort. When considering the credibility of any statistical analysis, the fact that the actual treatment sample consists of only 62 participants for whom a complete data set was available should be kept in mind. (See Figure 5: From Agency Referral to Meaningful Engagement, below).

Given the variety of reasons for non-participation (See Table 4, The Reasons for Non-participation below [from highest to lowest]), only two are amenable to positive change. First, the typical juvenile probation mandate is 60 days. When referrals to SBCC were made too close to the end of a mandate, neither juveniles nor their families perceived SBCC as a viable option. Under those conditions, it was less intrusive, went the argument, to complete the terms of the probation mandate: “When it’s over, it’s over.” Second, new attendees, often ambiguous or tenuous about participation, might be more likely to engage if they received personal encouragement. A home visit might be one of several encouraging options. The point is that redirected effort on the part of SBCC staff and mentors might address a tractable source of participant loss.

*Intake Group Demographics:*  

Of the 85 juveniles who had completed intake by October 2013, most were 15 years old (N=34, 40%). Twenty-four (N=24, 28%) were 14 years old, 13 were 13 years of age (15%) and two youngsters were 12.

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24 Social network lists were informally created by the Family Support Coordinator.  
25 Meaningful engagement was defined as 75% uninterrupted attendance for those whose attendance fell within one of the following time categories: 30-60 days; 61-90 days; 91-120 days; or, 121+ days.
Nearly as many who completed intake were 16 (N=12; 14%) as were 13. (See Figure 6.)

Race, Ethnicity, and Prior System Involvement:
The majority of juveniles completing intake were male (N=66, 78%); 19 (22%) were female. Although predominantly Hispanic (N=51, 60%), CCFY processed 31 African Americans (36%), two (2) multi-racial juveniles, and 1 (1) Caucasian. Although 61% of the population at intake had no prior involvement with the criminal justice system, more than a third (39%, 33) did. Nonetheless, “creaming” the participant pool can be disregarded as an issue, since both the YASI assessment instrument and New York City’s risk assessment ranked the vast majority of these adolescents as medium to high risk. See Figures 7 and 8 below for illustration.

Offense Charges at Intake:
There was little variation in precipitating charges during the course of the pilot. All charges were misdemeanors, the most consistent of which was for Assault (N=22, including Assault 3, 2; Gang Assault; Menacing 2). Assaults were followed by Weapons

![Figure 7. The Reasons for Non-participation](image)

18

![Figure 8. Age of Juveniles at Intake: N = 85](image)

- Age 12
- Age 13
- Age 14
- Age 15
- Age 16
charges (N=12). The remainder of the charges involves fewer individual youth, but are nonetheless troubling, because they shadow the detritus that floods the adult system. Trespass charges (N=10, 12%), for example, encapsulate a number of “street level” offenses: marijuana possession, robberies, obstruction, graffiti, menacing, harassment, promoting gambling, unlawful assembly, theft of services, and criminal mischief. Together, they constitute 29% of the charges at SBCC intake. As can be seen by comparing these figures in Figure 9 to those in Figure 10, Arrest Charges for Tx Group, the arrest charges attributable to the intake and treatment groups are similar.

**Juvenile Strengths at Intake:** Having abandoned the YASI in favor of more strength-based assessment, intake interviews, conducted between the last quarter of Year 2 and the first quarter of Year 3, were re-focused, albeit clumsily, in an attempt to identify

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**Figure 9.**
Race & Ethnicity at Intake:

![Race & Ethnicity at Intake](chart1)

**Figure 10.**
Prior System involvement at Intake

![Prior System involvement at Intake](chart2)
juvenile strength. Though a commendable effort, remedial data tasks short-circuited SBCC staff ability to complete the Intake Assessment summaries in time for this report. That process will be completed and improved for the project’s Phase II report.

Despite the status of the juvenile strength data, it is interesting to note that the majority of juveniles who completed the re-focused intake interview laid claim to close family ties, especially with one’s mother. This is not surprising, when considering that most of those interviewed lived with their mothers.

Yet the YASI identified family relationships as “problematic” for 66% of the initial cohort of CCFY participants. There may be several plausible explanations that account for the discontinuity between the YASI outcomes and the claim of the second cohort to close family ties, but the tenuous nature of the recent strength-based assessment precludes a fuller discussion of this issue at the present time.

The evaluation team recognizes, and accepts responsibility for the unsatisfactory method used to identify participant strengths. Unlike the standardized YASI, which SBCC staff had used to identify risk related factors, the questionnaire developed by the Principal Investigator, in collaboration with SBCC, was neither piloted, nor normed. Standardized instruments and piloted interviews are important to robust program evaluations; the absence of both threatens the credibility of the data produced, complete or incomplete. To address this methodological shortcoming, the CCFY Executive Director would be well served by initiating a search for normed PYD assessment tools. For example, The Rochester Evaluation of Asset Development for Youth (READY) Tool would be a helpful beginning.26

Participant Living Arrangements: As illustrated in Figure 11, nearly 70% of the SBCC participants lived with a single mom (N=57, 67%). Eleven (N=11, 13%) lived with their fathers, or guardian; six were living with a father and stepmother (6, 7%); five (5, 6%) lived with both parents; five lived with a grandmother (5, 6%); and one (N=1) was living with a mother and stepfather.

![Figure 11. Arrest Charges at Intake: N=85](image)

Top arrest charge of all referrals who successfully completed intake. The 8 youth with “No Charge” includes youth who were referred by schools/police and were not formally charged with a crime. The 7 “Other” charges include Menacing (1); Harassment (3); Promoting Gambling (1); Unlawful Assembly (1); Theft of Services (1); Criminal Mischief (1); and Endangering the Welfare of a Child (1).

![Figure 12. Arrest Charges of Tx Group: N=62](image)

Top arrest charge of all participants in the Tx group. The “Other” charges include Graffiti (2); Menacing (2); Harassment (1); Promoting Gambling (1); Obstruction of Governmental Administration (2); Criminal Mischief (1); and Unspecified (2)
As can be seen in Figure 12, the living arrangements between the Intake and actual Treatment Groups are similar.

Length and Intensity of Engagement: Data cleaning indicated the number of youth “meaningfully” engaged in SBCC fell considerably short of the anticipated figure (N=85). More credibly, only 62 participants had been meaningfully engaged at a SBCC partner site. Prompted by an even smaller treatment sample than envisioned, ensuing conversations with the VERA Institute of Justice staff focused on a comparison group comprised of ALL juvenile arrests in the Bronx between October 1, 2010 and June 30th, 2013. The data provided by VERA included demographic information, current charge, risk-related, prior arrest, and new arrest and case data. The inclusion of all juvenile arrests in the Bronx obviated the need for treatment group random assignment as generally preferred, and satisfied all but one of the most serious of the methodological constraints — the limited size of the treatment group.

Table 2, below, Critical Recidivism Attributes: Tx vs. Comparison Groups indicates the unbalanced differences between the two groups. In as much as the variables identified in the left hand column are all empirically related to the outcome variable of interest — recidivism — any of the left hand variables that remained unbalanced would increase the probability of a difference in recidivism. The limitations imposed by the treatment group

---

sample size led the analyst to weight the comparison group (Table 2) so that it had the same attribute distribution as the SBCC group, un-weighted. Thus, the weighted comparison group and the un-weighted SBCC group were balanced with respect to their attributes.

Table 3, Re-arrest/New Cases Within 12 Months: Tx vs. Comparison Groups, illustrates the results of the recidivism analysis. The columns labeled Ct and Tx present two different definitions of recidivism — any re-arrest within a year, and any new case within a year. The column labeled “Diff” shows the actual difference in the recidivism rates and the column labeled “z-test” produces a score for testing different hypotheses.

The “p-values” have standard interpretations: a p-value of less than 0.01 implies a confidence level of 99%. A p-value of 0.1 or less implies a confidence level of 10%, which is significant but very weak.

Note that the base recidivism rates for the SBCC youth are lower than the recidivism rates for the comparison group. The numbers are lower for both definitions of recidivism — re-arrest as well as a new case — and for both the unbalanced and balanced samples. However, given the small sample size of the SBCC treatment group, the differences are statistically significant at low levels of confidence, meaning that while differences do exist, the evidence is still too weak to support strong conclusions.

Table 2.
Critical Recidivism Attributes: Tx vs. Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unbalanced</th>
<th>Balanced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ct</td>
<td>Tx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3092</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1640</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
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<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge Severity</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misd/Vio</td>
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<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felony</td>
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<td>52</td>
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<td>Age at Intake</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>14.92</td>
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Despite the small sample size, sub-group analyses were conducted to identify differences in the recidivism rates for different levels of SBCC program dosage (see Table 3). Note again that the sample sizes — precariously small for the total group — are now too small to conduct any analysis of statistical significance. Thus the sub-group analyses are purely descriptive.

Of the 62 youth in the SBCC treatment sample, (See Figure 15, next page) more than 50% were identified as having been meaningfully engaged for 120+ days. Nearly a quarter of them (N=15, 24%) had been engaged for 60 days or less. Nearly another quarter (N=14, 23%) were reportedly engaged between 61 and 120 days. As one would expect, relevant to dosage, the recidivism rates differed among the various dosage levels, but not in easily interpretable ways. However, when an intensity of participation measure was added to the dosage measure, juveniles who were more actively involved for longer periods of time were suggestively less likely to be arrested within the year, and less likely to have their arrests result in a new case. To be kept in mind is that relying on the small treatment group for “within group” comparison, though interesting and suggestive, is an outcome that is far from robust.

Thus, quantitative analyses indicate, albeit weakly, that SBCC youth do have lower recidivism rates as measured by a re-arrest, or a new case, within a year, as compared to a matched borough-wide comparison group. Also encouraging, those juveniles who engage in multiple activities and who remain active beyond their probation mandate appear to heading toward pro-social maturation.

### Table 3.
Re-arrest/New Cases Within 12 Months: Tx vs. Comparison Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unbalanced Samples</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any Re-arrest within 1 year</td>
<td>Ct</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any new case within 1 year</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced Sample</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Re-arrest within 1 year</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any new case within 1 year</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.
Tx Subgroup Differences in Recidivism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Cohort</th>
<th>All Cases from Vera</th>
<th>Tx Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any re-arrest within 1 year</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any new case within 1 year</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-arrest and new case within 1 year</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Cohort</th>
<th>All Cases from Vera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any re-arrest within 1 year</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any new case within 1 year</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-arrest and new case within 1 year</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Many juveniles, especially those who participated for more than 90 days, participated in several activities that were in addition to a weekly meeting. Additional participation totals were divided among three statistically determined categories (Low to High) and recidivism was examined for those within each of the groups.
Bibliography


Appendices
Appendix A. Recidivism Within 12 Months – Treatment Group vs. Comparison Groups

Revised Table and Graph

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>p-val for hypothesis</th>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unbalanced Samples</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Re-arrest within 1 year</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any new case within 1 year</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balanced Sample</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Re-arrest within 1 year</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any new case within 1 year</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Revised Graph

Revised Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>p-val for hypothesis</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ct</td>
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<td><strong>Unbalanced Samples</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any new case within 1 year</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Examples of Self-Referrals

Improvements in Performance/Accountability Measures

Development of \( STGY3 \) for \( T(2) \) Community Awareness & \( T(2) \) Community Awareness/Satisfaction Measures

- \( STGY4 \) to evaluate the efficacy of parent support groups

SBCC facilitators will convene neighborhood focus groups where youth, Group Leaders, neighborhood representatives and residents can share quality of life concerns that can be evidenced by increases/decreases in community life, especially those in conflict (i.e. senior citizens, small neighborhood projects will join youth and community together to foster empathy, interdependence and mutual support)

For \( T(1) \) Community Awareness Measures, the project will measure indicators of community involvement in youth activities, educational achievement, community awareness of program results, youth assessment of his/her performance, Group Leaders (target population)

SBCC will work with Group Leaders and youth groups (N=3 to 4) to develop, implement, monitor, and evaluate the effectiveness of interventions to improve youth attendance at school and to establish a baseline profile of youth. SBCC will use a clinical practitioner to establish a baseline profile of youth.

The project will involve \( T(1) \) Community Awareness Measures, monitoring of the project to determine impact and efficient distribution of resources for the identified target population.

In the \( T(1) \) Community Awareness Measures, the project will measure indicators of community involvement in youth activities, educational achievement, community awareness of program results, youth assessment of his/her performance, Group Leaders (target population), so that the project can be evaluated.

Intergenerational projects will join youth and community to evidence by to determine impact and efficient distribution of resources for the identified target population.

In the \( T(1) \) Community Awareness Measures, the project will measure indicators of community involvement in youth activities, educational achievement, community awareness of program results, youth assessment of his/her performance, Group Leaders (target population), so that the project can be evaluated.

For \( T(2) \) Community Awareness/Satisfaction Measures, the project will measure indicators of youth satisfaction with participation in ancillary enhancements, behavioral achievements and self-assessment evaluations, and the underlying reasons for those changes;

For \( T(2) \) Community Awareness/Satisfaction Measures, the project will measure indicators of youth satisfaction with participation in ancillary enhancements, behavioral achievements and self-assessment evaluations, and the underlying reasons for those changes; a local youth satisfaction measure (TBD) will be used to determine the project satisfaction.

The project goals (target population) will include a local youth satisfaction measure (TBD) to determine the project satisfaction.

For \( T(2) \) Community Awareness/Satisfaction Measures, the project will measure indicators of youth satisfaction with participation in ancillary enhancements, behavioral achievements and self-assessment evaluations, and the underlying reasons for those changes; a local youth satisfaction measure (TBD) will be used to determine the project satisfaction.

The project goals (target population) will include a local youth satisfaction measure (TBD) to determine the project satisfaction. The project will use the same methodology and tools to track and measure all its key indicators.

The project goals (target population) will include a local youth satisfaction measure (TBD) to determine the project satisfaction. The project will use the same methodology and tools to track and measure all its key indicators.
Appendix B-3. South Bronx Community Connections

Theory of Change

The model is a causal model, or a ‘black box’ model showing the relationship between theory, program, strategy, and impact. The model is used to understand the logic of a program and to identify the assumptions, gaps, and implications of the program's design and implementation.

The model can be expressed as follows:

Impact = Strategy + Program + Theory of Change

The model can be used to develop a logic model that illustrates the hypothesized relationships between the program and the expected outcomes. The logic model can be used to identify the assumptions and gaps in the program design and to identify the necessary conditions for success.

The model can also be used to assess the credibility of the program. The model can be used to assess the plausibility of the program's design and the likelihood of success.

The model can be used to inform program evaluation. The model can be used to identify the key indicators of success and to design evaluation strategies.

The model can also be used to inform program planning. The model can be used to identify the key components of the program and to design a comprehensive program plan.

The model can be used to inform program implementation. The model can be used to identify the key components of the program and to design a comprehensive implementation plan.
Appendix C. MOU Sample SBCC - Bronx Office of NYC Corp. Counsel

Memorandum of Understanding

This AGREEMENT made this 29 day of July 2011 by and between the Family Court Division of the New York City Law Department (hereafter "Corporation Counsel") having an address of 100 Church Street, New York, NY and Community Connections for Youth, Inc., having an address of 199 Lincoln Avenue, Suite 212, Bronx, NY 10454 (hereafter "CCFY") both a "Party" or, together, the "Parties".

WHEREAS, CCFY is a not-for-profit corporation formed for the purpose of empowering grassroots faith and neighborhood organizations to develop effective community-driven alternatives to incarceration for youth;

WHEREAS, Corporation Counsel is a city agency that plays a critical role in promoting the well-being of the City's children and protecting the general public, and by prosecuting juvenile crime, seeks to ensure that those who commit delinquent acts will be held accountable for their misconduct and afforded an opportunity for rehabilitation;

WHEREAS, CCFY has received JJDPA formula grant funding from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services through the Juvenile Justice Advisory Group to implement South Bronx Community Connections, a research-based initiative to provide early intervention for youth in the juvenile justice system in a community setting as part of New York State's ongoing efforts towards juvenile justice reform;

WHEREAS, Corporation Counsel plays a critical role in facilitating interventions that promote accountability, public safety, and rehabilitation as part of New York City's ongoing juvenile justice reform efforts;

WHEREAS, Corporation Counsel and CCFY desire to set forth in this agreement their duties and responsibilities to each other with respect to the implementation and development of South Bronx Community Connections;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises, conditions and covenants contained herein, the parties hereto agree as follows:

1. Corporation Counsel will identify youth appropriate to be served by the South Bronx Community Connections initiative that fit the criteria defined by CCFY, which include: youth who reside in the Mott Haven neighborhood of the South Bronx; are ages 13-15 at time of arrest; have a history of prior juvenile justice involvement or offending behavior; and can be considered for prosecutorial diversion on the instant offense, an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, a conditional discharge, or alternatively are likely to benefit from participation in the CCFY program.
2. Corporation Counsel will refer eligible youth to CCFY to be served through the *South Bronx Community Connections* initiative.

3. Corporation Counsel and CCFY will collaborate to set terms of participation for each individual youth participant that further shared goals of community safety and youth rehabilitation.

4. Corporation Counsel and CCFY will avoid "net widening" by mandating to participate only youth who otherwise would not be considered for prosecutorial diversion (for diversion referrals), an adjournment in contemplation of a dismissal (ACD) (for ACD referrals) or a conditional discharge (for conditional discharge referrals) except for the fact that an alternative program is available. Youth whose cases would normally be declined without additional requirements or conditions, or youth already deemed eligible for an ACD or a conditional discharge, may still be referred and may be enrolled in the program, but may not be required to participate as a condition for an ACD, a conditional discharge or diversion.

5. CCFY will provide the following services to participants in the *South Bronx Community Connections* initiative: full psychosocial and risk/needs/strengths assessments and individualized strategy planning; family strengthening services and parenting skills classes; assignment of a Community Coach and participation in neighborhood improvement projects at a community partner site.

6. CCFY will provide compliance reports to Corporation Counsel on youth participation in *South Bronx Community Connections*, specifying whether youth have successfully completed the core components of the initiative.

7. Corporation Counsel may, in its discretion, decline to prosecute cases for those youth who have successfully completed *South Bronx Community Connections* and have not re-offended. Additionally, Corporation Counsel may, with the consent of CCFY, ask the court to impose as a condition of a disposition or court order that the youth successfully complete the CCFY program. Corporation Counsel may apply to the court for legally available relief for youth who do not successfully complete the CCFY program or who re-offend.

8. Corporation Counsel and CCFY will routinely share general information with each other for the purpose of making necessary adjustments and refinements to the process of determining eligibility, facilitating referrals, reporting on progress and improving and troubleshooting other areas of project management. The process of sharing of confidential data on youth served by *South Bronx Community Connections* with CCFY's research partner, the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, for the purpose of tracking court outcomes, i.e. re-arrests, convictions, out-of-home placements, etc. will be defined in a separate MOU.
9. There shall be no religious worship, instruction or proselytizing as part of or in connection with the provision of services under this Agreement.

10. This Agreement is effective as of the final date of signature below, and will continue until terminated.

11. This Agreement may be modified if done so in writing and agreed upon by both Parties.

12. This Agreement shall be construed under the laws of New York State and contains the full and complete understanding of both Parties. This Agreement supersedes all other prior agreements and understandings, whether written or oral.

13. If any provision of this Agreement shall be held to be invalid, illegal, unenforceable or in conflict with the law of any jurisdiction, the validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining provisions shall not in any way be affected or impaired.

14. All notices, acknowledgments, requests, reports and other communications under this Agreement shall be in writing, either by letter (first class mail), telecopy, or email addressed as follows:

   **If to Corporation Counsel:**
   
   Attention: Lisa Grumet  
   Telecopier No.:  
   Email: lgrumet@law.nyc.gov

   **If to CCFY:**
   
   Attention: Rev. Ruben Austria  
   Telecopier No.: (347) 438-3215  
   Email: ruben@cc-fy.org

By signing this document, the signatories attest that they have the power and authority to bind each entity listed.

**ACCEPTED AND AGREED:**

**Corporation Counsel**

Lisa Grumet  
Printed Name  
Chief of Policy & Planning  
Title  
Signature  
7/29/11  
Date

**Community Connections for Youth**

Ruben Austria  
Printed Name  
Executive Director  
Title  
Signature  
July 29, 2011  
Date
Appendix D. SBCC Presentation to JJAG Meeting Fall 2012

The Community Connections Model
A greenway renegotiation approach to building a community connection system to support community re-engagement in the prevention and control of public systems.

Presentation to the New York State Juvenile Justice Advisory Group, December 3, 2013

“A Single Idea…”
- DCF's RFP: "Breakthrough Research-Based Strategies"
  - The potential of "Community Change Leadership" to help connect communities to strategic opportunities
  - A well thought-out, researched plan
  - The ability to scale the solution
  - A commitment by the program to measure results
  - The ability to shape the program beyond the funding period

- Building Community Capacity for Juvenile Justice Reform

Organizing Community Stakeholders: Selecting Partners for Sub-Contracts
- SBCC Sites
- Bulletin Community Center
- Friends of Book Park
- Y.E.S. A. Area Program
- F.U.S.E.D.
- United Way

Organizing Community Stakeholders: Choosing a Target Neighborhood
- Organizational and neighborhood organizations that are located in the local neighborhood
- Youth management and leadership development
- Youth violence reduction
- "Credible Messengers" who are role models
- "Credible Messengers" who are role models

Engaging System Partners: Adapting to Policy Changes
- Community Connections: Building a community connection system to support community re-engagement in the prevention and control of public systems.

Engaging System Partners: Referring by Quarter
- Referrals by Quarter

Engaging System Partners: Adapting to Policy Changes
- Developing local partnerships that result in interventions and policies that keep youth safe in the community.

Positive Youth Development Approach
- Focus on strengths and competencies instead of risks and needs
- Community Coaching from "Credible Messengers"
- Site-based neighborhood improvement projects

Family Engagement is Key!
- Family Support Groups
- Strengthening Families Program (SFP)
- Parent Peer Coaches

Family Support Group Attendance
- Attendance by Quarter

Masculinity Completion Status
- Of the 71 youth mandated between October 1, 2011 and September 30, 2013
- 71 youth were mandated
- 71 youth were still under mandate as of December 30, 2013
- 71 youth were not mandated
- Note: 8 youth engaged who were not under formal mandate

Post-Mandate Participation
- 71 youth
- 29% participated voluntarily in activities prior mandate
- 43% of youth who completed mandante are currently still active in the program
- 170 youth mandated

Length of Engagement
- Youth Engagement
- Youth Done in Time
- Youth Under mandate
- Youth Longer than Time

Sustainability & Reusability
- Private Foundation Funding to expand to 445 Present and continue original project (SBCC Annual)
- Training & Technical Assistance Grant to facilitate comparable projects nationally (SBCC over 2 years)
- NYC Social Impact Bond considered and NYS Pay for Success program currently under review
- Possibility of STSIP funding for county projects

Questions?

Contact Information
Dr. Nancy Jacobs
dr.jacobs@nyu.edu

Shanice Hatfield
shanice@sbcc.org

Jeannette Buzzenga
jeannette@sbcc.org

Appendix D. SBCC Presentation to JJAG Meeting Fall 2012
Appendix D. SBCC Presentation to JJAG- 2011-2012

South Bronx Community Connections Project Update

COMMUNITY CONNECTIONS FOR YOUTH

Robert Austria, CCFY
Nancy Jacobs, John Jay
April 26, 2012

OVERVIEW OF LOCAL GAP ANALYSIS

JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS

- Very few front-end diversions that offer robust support to youth and families
- Juvenile justice stakeholders unsure how to identify and engage community organizations
- Community-based organizations provide rich youth development programming, but don’t connect to the juvenile justice system
- Absence of strength-based, community-driven juvenile justice interventions

FOCUS OF GRANT-FUNDED REFORM EFFORT

- To build community capacity to serve youth in the juvenile justice system
- To connect youth to pro-social activities in their home neighborhoods
- To connect youth to long-term supportive relationships with positive adults in their communities
- To evaluate the efficacy of building on local neighborhood organizations

STAKEHOLDERS

What relationships are key to the success of this work?

- Corporation Counsel (Family Court Prosecutors)
- Juvenile Probation (Intake Division)
- Betances Community Center
- Freedom Community Center
- Y.U.C.A., Inc./Mott Haven Reformed Church
- Friends of Brook Park
- John Jay College of Criminal Justice

GRANT SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES

How are funds being used?

- Contracting for Independent Evaluation
- Hiring Project Staff including full-time L-MSW
- Sub-grants to 4 neighborhood organizations
- Underwriting neighborhood improvement projects
- Implementing evidence-based Strengthening Families Program

ANTICIPATED RESULTS

- Youth will successfully complete diversion programs from Family Court
- Youth will connect to neighborhood organizations and maintain relationships with community coaches
- Community organizations will better understand how to serve youth in the juvenile justice system
- Juvenile justice stakeholders will identify ways to partner with community organizations

PROGRESS TOWARD PROJECT GOALS

- Logic Model & Evaluation Plan Developed
- Target Population & Referral Agreements Developed
- 4 Neighborhood Organizations sub-contracted
- 22 Community Coaches trained
- 24 Youth Receiving Services
- Strengthening Families Program Implemented
- 3 Neighborhood Improvement Projects Started

DATA PLANS

- Collection of data through the YASI online interface
- CCFY designing an MIS database system to capture the impact of positive youth development activities and positive relationships
- Partnership with Vera Institute of Justice and Criminal Justice Coordinator for long-term reconviction analysis

EVALUATION PLAN

- Independent evaluation by John Jay College of Criminal Justice
- Post-program recidivism analysis with support from Criminal Justice Coordinator and Vera Institute of Justice
- Qualitative evaluation examining the process of what it takes to build community capacity

FINAL THOUGHTS

What should we know about the process?

- Building community capacity is harder than anyone imagined
- Developing community capacity still yields better results than anyone imagined
- Reforming the juvenile justice system and building safe and healthy communities can only be done by building community capacity

57
Appendix E. NYPD Juvenile Report - Sample

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<th>Last Name</th>
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<th>M.I.</th>
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<th>No</th>
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| Injured                      | Yes                              | No    | No   |

| Approaching Officer          |                                  |       |      |

| Assigned                     | Yes                              | No    | Yes  |

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<th>Date</th>
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<th>In Front Of</th>
<th>Rear Of</th>
<th>Opposite Of</th>
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</thead>
</table>

| Cross Streets                | &                                | 1 & 2                          | Yes    | No         | Yes     | No         |

| Corner                      | NW                               | SE                              | NW     | SE         | NW      | SE         |

| Juv. Report Numbers Of Associates | 1                             | 2                             | 3     | Yes       | No     | Yes       | No       |

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<th>Type</th>
<th>Drugs</th>
<th>Firearms</th>
<th>Curr.</th>
<th>Boat</th>
<th>Drugs</th>
<th>Fires</th>
<th>Curr.</th>
<th>Boat</th>
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<th>Fires</th>
<th>Curr.</th>
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<th>Relationship</th>
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<th>Last Name</th>
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<tr>
<th>Address</th>
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<th>Email Address</th>
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<th>Time</th>
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<tr>
<th>Home Phone No.</th>
<th>Cell Phone No.</th>
<th>Work Phone No.</th>
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<th>No</th>
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| Telephone Calls              |                                  | 1. ( ) Name                      | 2. ( ) Name  |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------|----|

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<th>Physical Condition</th>
<th>Apparently Normal</th>
<th>Injury-To Hospital</th>
<th>Intox-Drugs</th>
<th>Spot-To Hospital</th>
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<th>EDP-To Hospital</th>
<th>Injury-Treated &amp; Released</th>
<th>Intox-UUnknown</th>
<th>Sick-RMA</th>
<th>Sick-Treated &amp; Released</th>
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<th>Type of Drug/Alcohol</th>
<th>How Long Used?</th>
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<th>Number of Prior School</th>
<th>School Number</th>
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<th>Relative</th>
<th>Parent</th>
<th>Guardian</th>
<th>Name (Print)</th>
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<th>LAW</th>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>SUB.</th>
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<th>TYPE</th>
<th>COUNTS</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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<th>Top Chg.</th>
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<th>No</th>
<th>1st Chg.</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>2nd Chg.</th>
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<th>3rd Chg.</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>4th Chg.</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>5th Chg.</th>
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<th>If Drug Possession/Sale Is Top Charge</th>
<th>Crack</th>
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<th>Opium Deriv.</th>
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<th>City/State Enforcement Agent Involved</th>
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<th>Rank/Title</th>
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<th>Command</th>
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Appendix F. DCJS Juvenile Arrest Report - Bronx County - 2010 - 2012

Bronx Juvenile Justice Trends
2010 - 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrests</td>
<td>4,039</td>
<td>3,748</td>
<td>2,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation Intakes</td>
<td>3,949</td>
<td>3,685</td>
<td>2,643</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petitions Filed</td>
<td>1,506</td>
<td>1,247</td>
<td>1,190</td>
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</table>
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Community Connections for Youth

Neighborhood Replication Process

I. Juvenile Justice Stakeholder Engagement

A. Quantitative Data: Review most recent juvenile arrest, intake, and prosecution data for the target community:

- From NYPD: request arrest date on juveniles residing in the precinct in question, disaggregated by arrest charge, race, gender, and geography (if possible).
- From PSA: request arrest date on juveniles residing in the housing precinct in question, disaggregated by arrest charge, race, gender, and geography (if possible).
- From Department of Probation: request intake data on juveniles residing in the precinct in question, disaggregated by arrest charge, race, gender, and geography (if possible).
- From NYC Law Department (Corporation Counsel): request intake data on juveniles residing in the precinct in question, disaggregated by arrest charge, race, gender and geography (if possible).
- From Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) Division of Youth & Family Justice (DYFJ): review detention admission statistics for the zip codes in the precinct in question.

Person Responsible: __________________________ 1/31/2013

B. Qualitative Data: Interview system stakeholders representing target community with questions about the types and nature of offenses in the 44th precinct.

- From NYPD: what are the most common arrest charges for youth in your precinct? What arrests would you prefer to divert from court if there was a specific community program available? What specific issues on the ground in the target community are contributing to juvenile arrests in the precinct (i.e. gang issues, school issues)? Put another way, what specific challenges should we be prepared to deal with that would make youth from the target precinct likely to be re-arrested? Are there specific areas where most of the arrests take place, or where most of the youth arrested live?
- From PSA: what are the most common arrest charges for youth in your precinct? What arrests would you prefer to divert from court if there was a specific community program available? What specific issues on the ground in the target community are contributing to juvenile arrests in the precinct (i.e. gang issues, school issues)? Put another way, what specific challenges should we be prepared to deal with that would make youth from the target precinct likely to be re-
arrested? Are there specific houses where most of the arrests take place, or where most of the youth arrested live?  
• From **Department of Probation**: what are the most common arrest charges for youth coming in from the target precinct? Which cases would you prefer to adjust if there was a specific community programs available?  
• From **Corporation Counsel**: what are the most common arrest charges that come across your desk for prosecution from the target precinct? Which cases would you likely decline to prosecute or send back for adjustment if there was a specific community program available? 

Person Responsible: ______________________  Deadline: ___1/31/2013___

C. **Agency Leadership Outreach**: communicate project broad outlines to commissioner and deputy commissioner level personnel for system stakeholders; discuss program parameters and solicit support from executive leadership; request specific support around any alterations to agency processes.

Person Responsible: ________________  Deadline: ___1/31/2013___

D. **Target Population Summary**: create a target population summary that includes the following variables: age at arrest, address of residence, arrest charge (or reason for police contact). Dis-aggregate for specific referral sources if necessary.

Person Responsible: ___ __  Deadline: ___2/15/2013___

E. **Key Contact List**: list the name, title and agency for each key contact from the various system stakeholders that is the most responsive to lead agency requests for information. This should be an individual who has a certain level of decision-making authority at their agency to effect referrals, and also is available and responsive to lead agency personnel.

Person Responsible: ______________________  Deadline: ___2/20/2013___

F. **MOU Preparation**: draft MOU outlining how the system stakeholder will work with the lead agency to handle referrals. Meet with executive leadership of each system stakeholder to discuss MOU and sign agreement.

Person Responsible: ________________  Deadline: ___2/28/2013___
II. Neighborhood Organization Engagement

A. Youth Program Review: collect names, locations, and program offerings of all listed youth programs operating in the target precinct/community district:

- Review official directories, such as funded program databases, Community
  District resource lists, etc.
- Also review unofficial directories to find programs that may not be listed/funded.
  Walking the neighborhood to identify youth programs may be required.
  Interviewing neighborhood stakeholders (see IIA may also be required).

Person Responsible: ___________________  Deadline: _____ 1/31/2013_____

B. Qualitative Review: interview community stakeholders to determine which agencies
are doing effective work with youth on the ground. Interview the following
stakeholders to discern which organizations might make effective partners:

- Youth: which youth programs are really doing a good job of engaging youth on
  the streets, or young people who are getting in trouble?
- Families: which youth programs are effective at reaching young people getting in
  trouble or having a lot of family conflict?
- Faith-based Organizations: which youth programs are really good at connecting
  with youth who are in getting in trouble, and partner well with neighborhood
  organizations?
- Community-based Organizations: which youth programs really specialize in
  engaging youth who are getting in trouble with the law?
- Schools: which youth programs are effective at engaging youth who are having
  trouble in school, getting arrested?
- System Partners: which youth programs do a good job of working with youth
  who are having trouble with law enforcement and the juvenile justice system?

Person Responsible: ___________________  Deadline: _____ 1/31/2013_____

C. Neighborhood Youth Organization Summary: create a summary of youth-serving
organizations for the target community, indicating which organizations are strong
candidates to serve as sites for a Community Connections project.

Person Responsible: ___________________  Deadline: _____ 2/10/2013_____

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D. Select Neighborhood Partners: decide on process of selecting neighborhood partners and make final decisions on 3 neighborhood partners to subcontract with.

   Person Responsible: ________________  Deadline: __2/28/2013__

E. MOU Execution: draft MOU outlining how each community partner will work with the lead agency to serve youth. Meet with executive leadership of each community agency to discuss MOU and sign agreement.

   Person Responsible: ________________  Deadline: __2/28/2013__

III. Pre-Implementation Training for Neighborhood Organizations

A. Database Training: prepare database profiles for each participating entity and schedule initial database training.

   Person Responsible: ________________  Deadline: __3/31/2013__

B. Coach Recruitment & Selection Training: provide initial training to selected sites on the process of community coach recruitment and selection; provide sites with specific training on recruiting Affinity Mentors as well as Community Coaches.

   Person Responsible: ________________  Deadline: __3/31/2013__

C. Community Coach Training: schedule and provide initial 5 hour training for community coaches recruited and selected by partnering sites.

   D. Person Responsible: ________________  Deadline: __3/31/2013__

E. Positive Youth Development Training: schedule and provide initial training for facilitators from partnering sites on positive youth development principles for facilitators.

   F. Person Responsible: ________________  Deadline: __3/31/2013__

G. Restorative Community Conferencing Training: schedule and provide initial 5-day training on restorative community conferencing for partners (if desired).

   IV. Person Responsible: ________________  Deadline: __3/10/2013__
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IV. Partner Organization Meetings

A. Site Coordinator Meetings: define and schedule Site Coordinator meetings. Recommended schedule: weekly for the first 3-6 months; bi-weekly for the next 3-6 months; monthly thereafter.

Person Responsible: 
Deadline: ________________

B. Data Specifications: define what data sets will be shared across sites at regular meetings.

Person Responsible: ________________ Deadline: ________________

C. Additional Training: define schedule of additional trainings (most likely quarterly) and define the process by which the learning community decides on follow-up trainings.

Person Responsible: Deadline: ________________

V. Community Engagement

A. Community Outreach & Leadership Identification: conduct street outreach, person-to-person networking, and investigation to identify “community elders” and other people of influence in the target neighborhoods.

Person Responsible: ________________ Deadline: ________________

B. Town Hall Meetings: hold at least two town hall meetings in the target community to bring community elders together to speak on youth concerns.

Person Responsible: ________________ Deadline: ________________

C. Community Engagement Write Up: draft write-up of key concerns, key community leaders.

Person Responsible: _____ Deadline: ________________
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VI. Learning Community Meetings

D. Stakeholder Engagement: determine motivation of each stakeholder to participate and individualized reasons for participating and/or barriers to participating.

Person Responsible: ____________________________  Deadline: _______________

E. Data Specifications: define data to be shared by each stakeholder

Person Responsible: ____________________________  Deadline: _______________

F. Participant Commitments: secure commitments from individuals representing each agency to attend meetings.

Person Responsible: ____________________________  Deadline: _______________

G. Date Selection: define frequency and duration of meetings and schedule first set of meetings on the calendar.

Person Responsible: ____________________________  Deadline: _______________

VII. Referral Partner Presentations

A. Materials Preparation: prepare materials for presentation to system stakeholder referral partners (brochure, referral form, FAQs, etc.)

Person Responsible: ____________________________  Deadline: __ 3/31/2013 

B. Schedule Presentations: schedule presentations to present the program to line staff from each of the participating system stakeholders.

Person Responsible: ____________________________  Deadline: __ 3/31/2013 __

C. Define Referral Start Date & Process: communicate to agency referral sources when they can begin making referrals

Person Responsible: ____________________________  Deadline: __ 3/31/2013 __
VIII. Youth Services

A. *Begin Youth Enrollment*: choose a start date for beginning enrollment of youth from the target precinct; decide on location and process for intake

Person Responsible: ________________________  Deadline: ___4/1/2013_____

B. *Begin Site Matching*: define method for matching youth to neighborhood sites; begin matching youth at neighborhood sites, being cognizant of number of youth required at each site to achieve “critical mass”

Person Responsible: ________________________  Deadline: ___4/1/2013_____

C. *Begin Family Services*: define strategy for engaging families in SBCC family programming, including SFP program.

Person Responsible: ________________________  Deadline: ___4/1/2013_____

D. *Begin Coach & Mentor Matching*: define a process for matching youth with coaches, and affinity mentors.

Person Responsible: ________________________  Deadline: ____________

E. *Facilitate Planning of Neighborhood-Wide Events*: meet with site coordinators to encourage planning of neighborhood wide events facilitated by sites together to develop a visible pro-social network in the community.

Person Responsible: ________________________  Deadline: ____________
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Preliminary Calendar/Milestones

By end of December

- Implementation Plan assignments distributed
- Details of Site MOUs, Learning Community Meetings, and System-Community Stakeholder meetings defined
- Juvenile Crime data requested from system partners

By end of January

- Juvenile arrest data collected and interviews completed
- Neighborhood mapping and preliminary meetings with possible sites completed
- MOU documents finalized, including requirements for data collection via MIS and participation in learning community and system-community stakeholder meetings

By end of February

- Sites selected and MOUs signed
- Referral process meetings held with system stakeholders
- Intake procedures finalized
- Coach recruitment trainings held
- Youth Development Training & Coach training held

By end of March

- Restorative Conferencing Training held
- Minimum of 15 community coaches (5 per site) recruited
- Minimum of 10 affinity mentors recruited

By end of April

- First round of youth referred and engaged in program
- First learning community meeting held
- First system-community stakeholder meeting held